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ABSTRACT
The Justices of the Supreme Court have a great deal in common
with the gifted pachyderm from the Walt Disney animated classic
feature Dumbo. Like Dumbo's "magic" feather that purportedly
enabled him to exercise his natural ability to fly, the tradition
limitation on the Court's jurisprudence on unenumerated
fundamental constitutional rights provides a more-apparent-than-
real constraint on the Court's almost unlimited ability to nullify
legislative and executive action. In all too many substantive due
process cases, reason seems to follow a predetermined result, rather
than the result in the case following from the applicable governing
principles. In this Article, Professor Krotoszynski argues that
substantive due process would benefit immeasurably if the Dumbo's
feather of tradition could be reworked into something resembling an
operational test that not only serves as ajustification for results that
a majority of the Justices might like to reach, but also as a brake
against results that a majority of the Justices might like to
reach-but that tradition, or consensus, does not yet sanction. In
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particular, Professor Krotoszynski argues that state counting could
provide an important means of cabining judicial discretion in
substantive due process cases, by making the application of the
tradition test turn less on subjective considerations. A carefully
theorized and operationalized effort at state counting might provide
a useful way of identifying andprotecting the traditions from which
we have broken, which are no less deserving of constitutional
protection than those traditions from which we have come. A
commitment to maintain tradition as a living concept deserves no
less.
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INTRODUCTION
In its Lawrence decision, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a
Texas statute that prohibited same-sex intimacy by consenting
adults in the privacy of the home.' In doing so, it reversed its earlier
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick2 because "[i]ts continuance as
precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons."' The Lawrence
majority opinion made an extended argument for the relevance of
more recent social attitudes-and legal treatment--of sexual
minorities as opposed to more long-standing, or even ancient,
traditions.4
The majority's concern with establishing a tradition-based
argument for invalidating antisodomy laws should not be surpris-
ing. Indeed, the Supreme Court consistently has identified "tradi-
tion" as the touchstone for its substantive due process jurispru-
dence. In order for the Court to recognize an unenumerated, yet
nevertheless fundamental, right, the Justices must consider
whether the right is deeply rooted in Anglo-American tradition such
that "neither liberty nor justice would exist" without it.' The test
sounds decidedly more concrete in theory than it actually seems to
be in practice.'
Indeed, the Supreme Court has been remarkably inconsistent,
even sloppy, in its application of the tradition test. The Court has
used various and sundry methodologies to ascertain tradition,
including reviewing Anglo-American legal practices and the
1. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
4. Id. at 571-77.
5. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14, 179-80 (1968) (noting that more
recent cases have defined "fundamental" rights as those "necessary to an Anglo-American
regime of ordered liberty"); see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (applying
the "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" test, but not requiring that the inquiry be
limited to the Anglo-American legal tradition), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 794 (1969).
6. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The 'FundamentalRight"
That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1893, 1916-32 (2004) (discussing and
contrasting various approaches to defining the scope of substantive due process rights in
cases involving the recognition of unenumerated, yet fundamental, rights).
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common law in the states, counting the number of states that
maintain contemporary regulations regarding a particular behavior,
relying solely on prior precedents, and considering how foreign
nations approach the topic.7 Moreover, in some cases, the Supreme
Court has found a fundamental right in the absence of a tradition
of recognizing the right at issue.8 No single means of opera-
tionalizing the tradition test has enjoyed consistent application and
observance.
If tradition is to provide a persuasive rationale for the recognition
and protection of unenumerated rights, the Supreme Court must
take greater care in enunciating and applying the test. In the
absence of clearer rules and guidelines for applying the tradition
test, it does little to counter the charge that substantive due process
has more to do with the subjective moral preferences of the Justices
than with any effort at principled constitutional adjudication.9
In the Walt Disney classic animated feature Dumbo, the young
elephant Dumbo had a remarkable gift: his supersized ears enabled
him to fly. Being different from one's peers is difficult at any age,
but it is particularly hard for the very young. Accordingly, Dumbo
attempted to hide this talent and to disclaim his ability to use his
ears to achieve flight.
In order to convince Dumbo to use his talents, some local birds
gave Dumbo a "magic feather" that would "permit" him to fly.
Armed with his magic feather, Dumbo achieved flight without fear
or undue retrospection. By shifting responsibility for his ability to
fly from his own innate gifts to the magic feather, Dumbo adroitly
7. See infra Part IIA-D.
8. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-86 (1996) (invalidating a
punitive damages award and imposing limits on punitive damages under substantive due
process, despite a longstanding tradition of jury-imposed punitive damages); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (finding a fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy under an
autonomy theory and despite widespread state prohibitions of practice).
9. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70-73 (1958) (arguing that judges must
approach the task of constitutional interpretation with great caution so as to avoid unduly
subjective decision making, and particularly objecting to federal judges wielding a judicial
"veto" that is wrapped "in a protective veil of adjectives such as 'arbitrary,' 'artificial,'
'normal,' 'reasonable,' 'inherent,' 'fundamental,' or 'essential,' whose office usually, though
quite innocently, is to disguise what they are doing and impute to it a derivation far more
impressive than their personal preferences, which are all that in fact he behind the
decision").
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avoided the cognitive dissonance associated with the realization
that his otherness permitted him to achieve what no other pachy-
derm had done before him: natural flight unaided by any mechani-
cal device.
Of course, Dumbo could fly because he had big ears---ears big
enough to generate some serious lift forces. The magic feather had
nothing to do with his ability to defy gravity. Dumbo needed the
magic feather because he had difficulty accepting his gift and its
full implications for his place in both the elephant and larger circus
community.
At least arguably, the Justices of the Supreme Court have a great
deal in common with Dumbo. Although possessed with an almost
unlimited ability to nullify legislative and executive action, 0
whether undertaken at the state or federal level, the Justices prefer
to think of their power of judicial review as relatively mundane.
Individually and collectively, the Justices attempt to find ways of
denying the full scope of their powers-both to themselves and to
the community at large." The Supreme Court's use of tradition in
setting the metes and bounds of fundamental rights provides an
excellent illustration of this phenomenon.
Like Dumbo's feather, the tradition limitation provides a more-
apparent-than-real constraint; the ability to exercise judicial review
to disallow statutes or executive actions really is not a function of
whether a law or action transgresses "tradition." Tradition is a label
given to support a result, but is not really the cause in fact of the
result. To put the matter slightly differently, in all too many
substantive due process cases, reason seems to follow a predeter-
mined result, rather than the result in the case following from the
applicable governing principles. It might be possible to develop and
10. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-29 (1997) (holding that Congress
cannot use its enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to redefine
the scope of substantive constitutional rights arising under section 1 and that the Supreme
Court alone decides whether a statute constitutes appropriate enforcement action of a
preexisting Fourteenth Amendment right); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-
78 (1803) (holding that federal courts have primacy in articulating the meaning of
constitutional text and the concomitant power to invalidate acts that the Court finds
inconsistent with the Constitution).
11. Justice Hugo L. Black's literalism provides an example of one of the less persuasive
efforts at subterfuge in this regard. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
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enforce a principled approach to limiting the scope ofjudicial review
to protect fundamental rights. Even so, the Justices have shown
little interest in either defining or following such limits. Instead,
the application of the tradition test remains almost entirely an ad
hoc affair. 12
Moreover, the operational difficulties associated with the
Supreme Court's use of tradition in fundamental rights adjudica-
tion are legion. The Justices have never specified the level of
generality at which one should attempt to ascertain "tradition."' 3
For example, if a judge asks whether homosexual sodomy has
enjoyed legal protection, the clear answer is, at least prior to the
1960s, "no." Before 1961, most states maintained formal legal
proscriptions against sodomy, whether of a same-sex or opposite-sex
variety. 4
If a judge reframes the question, however, and accesses "tradi-
tion" at a higher level of generality, the answer becomes less
obvious. The number of prosecutions and convictions for sodomy
involving consenting adults, in private, was minuscule. 5 Most
sodomy convictions involved a prosecutor invoking the sodomy
statute because she could not establish the elements of common law
12. See Veronica C. Abreu, Note, The Malleable Use of History in Substantive Due Process
Jurisprudence: How the "Deeply Rooted" Test Should Not Be a Barrier to Finding the Defense
of Marriage Act Unconstitutional Under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 44 B.C.
L. REv. 177, 204-05 (2002) ("The U.S. Supreme Court, although emphasizing tradition and
history as the roots from which fundamental rights stem, has been quite willing to overlook,
or to selectively read, such history and traditions.... The Court might also expose itself to
criticism for selectively employing such methodologies [as variations on the tradition test]
at its own judicial whim.").
13. Members of the Supreme Court fought a protracted, but inconclusive, battle over the
subject in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("We refer
to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to,
the asserted right can be identified.'); cf. id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion "sketches a mode of historical analysis to be used when
identifying liberty interests ... that may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions"
and refusing to "foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of
historical analysis"); id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the question is not
what 'level of generality' should be used ... but whether the relationship under consideration
is sufficiently substantial to qualify as a liberty interest under our prior cases").
14. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
15. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting
specifically that prosecutions under Texas's sodomy law are rare).
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rape. 16 When states adopted sexual assault statutes, even these
prosecutions largely disappeared from the scene.' 7 Thus, if "tradi-
tion" means not merely "law in books," but rather "law as applied
in practice," different answers to the question of legal tradition
regarding sodomy appear not merely possible, but likely.
A more relevant test might involve inquiry into the ubiquity of
the practice itself, independent of the existence of formal proscrip-
tions against the practice or the enforcement of such proscriptions.
To what extent, over time, have Americans actually engaged in
sodomy? Under this approach, the Kinsey Reports"8 would be more
immediately relevant to substantive due process analysis than
Blackstone or the Virginia Code of 1924. The Supreme Court has
almost never tried to ascertain the actual behaviors of the public in
applying the tradition test.
But the problem does not stop with an inquiry into the fact of
meaningful enforcement of the sodomy statutes. One could general-
ize the inquiry more broadly still, and inquire into relevant social
traditions regarding privacy in the home, or in the marital bedroom.
As one makes the level at which the decision maker accesses
tradition more general, the odds of finding a relevant tradition
respecting the autonomy claim increase. This explains Justice
Scalia's effort in Michael H. to limit the tradition inquiry to "the
most specific level at which a relevant tradition ... can be identi-
fied.""9 Had he succeeded in securing a majority for this approach,
most substantive due process claims would fail, because the
existence of state laws regulating or prohibiting a practice would
preclude a reviewing court from declaring a tradition of deference
to individual autonomy.
The level of generality problem, however, represents only the tip
of the iceberg. For a concept of such crucial importance in constitu-
tional law, the Supreme Court has provided scant guidance to lower
16. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631,
647-48, 679.
17. Id. at 661-63.
18. ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HuMAN FEMALE (1953); ALFRED
C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948).
19. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion); see Edward
Gary Spitko, Note, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia's Approach to Fundamental Rights
Adjudication, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1337, 1339, 1348-49.
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courts as to how to define relevant "tradition" in fundamental rights
cases.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I considers the origins of
the tradition test. Part II then examines in some detail the
Supreme Court's various methodologies for applying the tradition
test. Part III argues that the use of a consensus among the states,
or "state counting," as a means of defining "tradition" merits close
attention as a possible principled means of limiting the potential
scope of substantive due process. Part IV argues that using
consensus among the states, to nationalize a particular human
rights claim, could constitute a principled means of developing a
renewed federalism in which human rights norms develop from the
bottom up, rather than only from the top down. This Article
concludes that, even if one rejects an approach that focuses on the
existence of a strong contemporary consensus among the states as
the best means of defining "tradition," the Supreme Court still must
do more to operationalize the tradition test if the test is to serve as
more than a mere Dumbo's Feather.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF TRADITION AS THE LYNCHPIN OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS DOCTRINE
Since the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has
endorsed the view that the concept of due process of law requires
more than merely fair procedures.2 ° No matter how much procedure
government provides, some substantive ends are illegitimate and,
accordingly, unconstitutional. In deciding how to set the scope of
substantive due process rights, the Justices have used "tradition"
to identify fundamental, yet unenumerated, human rights.2'
20. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 660-61 (1887); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662-63 (1874). For a
discussion of late nineteenth century substantive due process doctrine and its historical and
philosophical underpinnings, see David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised:
Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 31-42
(2003).
21. See Abreu, supra note 12, at 181 ("In defining what constitutes a fundamental liberty
interest, the Court looks at whether the right in question is deeply rooted in our history,
traditions, and evolving collective conscience, such that it is implicit in the Anglo-American
concept of ordered liberty.").
[Vol. 48:923932
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This task was at the heart of the incorporation debates surround-
ing the application of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights against
the state governments.22 The concept also played a major role in the
articulation of the right of privacy and in the enforcement of equal
protection doctrine.23 This Part considers the role of tradition in the
incorporation process and the methodologies developed by the
Supreme Court to define and ascertain "tradition." One finds that,
as with the contemporary Supreme Court, the Justices have never
been wedded to any one test or methodology, favoring instead a
vigorously eclectic approach.
A. Early Use of Tradition: The Incorporation Debates
Beginning with Twining v. New Jersey24 and Palko v. Connecti-
cut," and continuing through Duncan v. Louisiana," the Supreme
Court has used tradition to determine whether particular guaran-
tees in the Bill of Rights apply to the states. In Twining v. New
Jersey, a defendant in a state criminal case argued that the concept
of "due process of law" encompassed a freedom from self-incrimina-
tion." The Supreme Court, after rejecting the notion that the Fifth
22. Cf. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-51 (1833) (outlining
"tradition" and original intent arguments against extending Bill of Rights restrictions to
state governments, and holding that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause should not limit
state action, as opposed to the action of the federal government).
23. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-11, 721 (1997) (explaining the
importance of tradition to substantive due process recognition and enforcement of
unenumerated fundamental rights and applying the tradition test); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 383-85, 388 (1978) (using history, tradition, and court precedents to analyze, on
equal protection grounds, restriction on right to marry); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 666-68 (1966) (applying the history and tradition test in the context of an equal
protection challenge raising the unenumerated fundamental right to vote); id. at 684-85
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (using history and tradition to reject equal protection challenge to
imposition of poll taxes as prerequisite to voting in state and local elections); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500-02 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that history and
tradition should not only determine the incorporation of particular provisions of the Bill of
Rights, but also should require judicial recognition of unenumerated, yet fundamental, rights
not set forth in the Bill of Rights); see also infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the Supreme Court's
use of the tradition methodology in modern substantive due process cases).
24. 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964).
25. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
26. 391 U.S. 145, 149-53 & n.14 (1968).
27. 211 U.S. at 90-91.
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Amendment's self-incrimination clause was binding on the states
as a "privilege or immunity" of federal citizenship, considered
whether the concept of due process of law secured that right.28 The
Court acknowledged that "[tihis contention requires separate
consideration, for it is possible that some of the personal rights
safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action
may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of
them would be a denial of due process of law. 29
To be clear, the Court stated that, if certain rights may be
safeguarded against state action, "it is not because those rights are
enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of
such a nature that they are included in the conception of due
process of law."3 ° Justice Moody described the test as whether the
right is "a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which
inheres in the very idea of free government and is the inalienable
right of a citizen."'" The right must be "an immutable principle of
justice which is the inalienable possession of every citizen of a free
government. 32
The majority concluded that the right against self-incrimination
was not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. First, the right
was not well established in English law prior to the American
Revolution.33 Second, looking to the debates surrounding the
ratification of the Constitution, the majority observed that "it
appears that four only of the thirteen original States insisted upon
incorporating the privilege in the Constitution."'34 Moreover, almost
all state constitutions that guaranteed the right did so expressly,
rather than as an incident of a generic due process or law of the
land clause, and only one state supreme court, the Iowa Supreme
Court, had found the right against self-incrimination to be an
aspect of a state constitution due process clause.35 Finally, looking
to the precedents of the Supreme Court, the right against self-
28. Id. at 99.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 106.
32. Id. at 113.
33. See id. at 102-08.
34. Id. at 109.
35. Id. at 110.
934 [Vol. 48:923
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incrimination had not been identified as having particular impor-
tance.36
Thus, Justice Moody offered three possible means of establishing
the fundamental nature of the right against self-incrimination:
British law, late-eighteenth-century law in the states, or prior
precedent of the Supreme Court.3" In applying the second category,
moreover, he engaged in an analysis relying on counting states that
insisted the federal government observe the privilege and states
with constitutions that guarantee the privilege.3"
Finally, Justice Moody abstracted the inquiry and considered the
privilege's importance more broadly: "It has no place in the
jurisprudence of civilized and free countries outside the domain of
the common law, and it is nowhere observed among our own people
in the search for truth outside the administration of the law . 39 This
represents an early recourse to comparative law-Justice Moody
plainly was referencing the practice in civil law countries, which
often used an investigative, or "inquisitorial," paradigm for the
adjudication of criminal charges rather than an adversarial model.4 °
In Palko v. Connecticut, Justice Cardozo described the relevant
test as whether the guarantee against double jeopardy contained in
the Fifth Amendment constitutes a "principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."41 Alternatively, substantive due process incorporates
"fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions."42 Due process protects
those liberty interests "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
that are "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," such that
"a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible
without them."43
36. See id. at 110-13.
37. See id. at 102-13.
38. See id. at 109-10.
39. Id. at 113.
40. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 124-32 (2d ed. 1985).
41. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934),
overruled inpart by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964)), overruled by Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
42. Id. at 328 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
43. Id. at 325.
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Most, but not all, provisions of the Bill of Rights have been
incorporated against the states through a process of "selective
incorporation."4' Although Justice Hugo Black argued for a
comprehensive incorporation of the first eight provisions of the Bill
of Rights,4" either through the privileges and immunities clause or
through the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole, a majority of the
Supreme Court never accepted this approach.46 Instead, the
Justices examined each provision of the Bill of Rights, breaking
compound amendments into discrete subparts.47
Thus, some provisions of the Fifth Amendment have been
incorporated against the states while others have not. For example,
the Supreme Court has found that the guarantees against self-
incrimination, double jeopardy, and uncompensated takings are
sufficiently "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"48 to be
incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.4" The Grand Jury Clause, ° on the
44. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 65 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
overruled in part by Malloy, 378 U.S. at 9.
45. See id. at 71-75 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing for "total incorporation" of the Bill of
Rights against the states, at least with respect to the First to Eighth Amendments, on the
theory that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended this result).
46. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-50 (1968); id. at 171 (Black, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the Supreme Court has settled on a process of "selective
incorporation" of the Bill of Rights under which the Justices consider whether to incorporate
individual provisions, or clauses, of each amendment and, if the Supreme Court incorporates
the provision against the states, it applies line for line, and jot for jot, in the same fashion
against the states as it does against the federal government). But see id. at 172-77 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the incorporation of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights
against the states should not imply that the provisions will apply in exactly the same fashion
against the states as they do against the federal government). For a discussion of the partial
versus total incorporation approach to applying the Bill of Rights against the states, see Toni
M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court's "Jot for Jot" Account of Substantive Due
Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086 (1998).
47. See supra note 46.
48. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
49. Id. Never mind the textual embarrassment of incorporating provisions of the Fifth
Amendment via a clause that itself appears in the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment
contains an identical due process clause to that in the Fourteenth Amendment; if the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause carries the weight the Supreme Court says
that it does, the Fifth Amendment (and indeed the Bill of Rights as a whole) was grossly
overwritten. The Framers could simply have written a single amendment providing that no
person "shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
50. U.S CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ....").
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other hand, does not safeguard a right "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."51 Accordingly, states are free to initiate a criminal
proceeding through an information to a state court judge, rather
than an indictment secured from a grand jury.52
Although tradition played an important part of the incorporation
process-indeed, it effectively defired the process-tradition has
played an important role in the articulation and enforcement of
other, unenumerated rights. Just as due process protects "funda-
mental" rights so deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition
that they appear in the Bill of Rights, it also grounds judicial
recognition of rights that have no written analogue in the Bill of
Rights.53 Enumeration in the Bill of Rights can be a sufficient
condition for judicial recognition and enforcement of a right against
the federal and state governments, but it is not a necessary con-
dition for such protection.
In defining the scope of constitutionally protected "liberty," the
Supreme Court has engaged in an analysis of whether tradition
supports the judicial recognition and enforcement of an un-
enumerated right. Judicial imposition of the "guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard arguably provides the least controver-
sial example of this behavior.54 Nothing in the Constitution speaks
to the standard of proof a state must meet to secure a criminal
conviction in a jury trial. Nevertheless, because of its common,
indeed universal, use in the state criminal justice systems over a
long period of time, the Supreme Court has held that the guilt
beyond reasonable doubt standard is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."55
51. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325; see Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972) ("[T]he
Court has never held that federal concepts of a 'grand jury,' binding on the federal courts
under the Fifth Amendment, are obligatory for the states.").
52. See Alexander, 405 U.S. at 633.
53. See infra Part I.B.
54. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 360 (1970).
55. See id. at 360-63; Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
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B. Defining Tradition: A Brief Overview of Five General
Approaches
The incorporation doctrine cases provide a good introduction to
the question of how to define tradition because they utilize several
of the methodologies that the Supreme Court uses today. Over time,
the Supreme Court has deployed five basic methodologies to define
"tradition." The Justices have consulted the state of the law at the
time of the framing to ascertain the level of acceptance that a right
had achieved at the time of the Constitution's or amendment's
adoption.5" We could call this the "tradition ascertained through
original intent" approach. This approach privileges natural rights
theory of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. If a
particular right seemed self-evident and inalienable, it stood a good
chance of adoption in a state constitution as well as in the Bill of
Rights.
A second methodology looks at whether the states have volun-
tarily recognized and protected a particular right over time.57 Thus,
if a jury trial for a felony has been and remains the means through
which states adjudicate criminal charges, a free-spirited state
would face difficulty abandoning the practice, say, in favor of a civil
law panel of judges. We might call this the "consistent observance"
test: if a strong majority of states historically has respected a right,
a strong presumption arises in favor of imposing the right against
efforts at experimentation. 58
A third methodology pays scant attention to original intent or
consistent observance and instead favors contemporary observance.
For example, in Loving v. Virginia, the Justices observed that
"Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish
marriages on the basis of racial classifications."5 9 Moreover, they
56. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 80-82, 107-13 and accompanying text.
58. See Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional
Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1745, 1823-24 (2004) (suggesting that Congress, as opposed to the
federal courts, might force law reform on "laggard" states and positing that "[ijfone believes
there are vanguard states and laggard states, the key question becomes whether to trust
Congress to choose the vanguard policy and impose it on the entire country-to take the risk
Justice Brandeis wanted to avoid").
59. 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967).
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further observed that "[o]ver the past 15 years [1952-1967], 14
States have repealed laws outlawing interracial marriages."60
Even though most states had such laws on the books in 1868 and
maintained those laws after ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,61 Chief Justice Warren dismissed this historical evidence,
explaining that "although these historical sources 'cast some light'
they are not sufficient to resolve the problem. 62 Thus, the Four-
teenth Amendment's framers' original intent and a consistent
historical practice running against interracial marriage did not
foreclose recognition of a constitutional right to interracial marriage
as a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clauses.
Chief Justice Warren's substantive due process analysis consisted
of less than a single page. He summarily announced that "[t]hese
statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of
law" because "[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men."63 This contention is probably true-but the
Supreme Court offered no authority to support this proposition.
Although a good argument exists that "[t]o deny this fundamen-
tal freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications
embodied in these statutes ... is surely to deprive all the State's
citizens of liberty without due process of law," '64 it is not an
argument based on tradition defined by the practice of state
governments in 1868, or even earlier. To the extent that a tradition
favoring interracial marriage existed, it related entirely to legal
changes developed in the post-World War II period.
Subsequent cases have treated this analysis as creating a
substantive due process right to marry, which a state cannot
abridge absent a compelling state interest and narrow tailoring.65
60. Id. at 6 n.5.
61. See id. at 9 ("The State argues that statements in the Thirty-ninth Congress about
the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment indicate that the Framers did not
intend the Amendment to make unconstitutional state miscegenation laws.").
62. Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954)).
63. Id. at 12.
64. Id.
65. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972) (citing Loving and noting that "[o]f
course, if we were to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges upon fundamental
freedoms under Griswold, the statutory classification would have to be not merely rationally
related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the achievement of a compelling state
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For example, in Zablocki, the majority simply invoked Loving and
concluded that "[w]hen a [state] statutory classification signifi-
cantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot
be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state
interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests."66
Thus, a fourth approach to defining tradition uses the Supreme
Court's own precedents as dispositive evidence of a particular socio-
legal practice. Over time, the Supreme Court's own precedents,
rather than some preexisting historical fact regarding meaningful
autonomy to marry freely, came to serve as the principal theoretical
justification for recognizing a substantive due process right to
marry.6" By the time the Supreme Court decided Moore v. City of
East Cleveland in 1977, only ten years after Loving, the justification
for subjecting certain state laws and regulations that affect family
life to heightened scrutiny rested almost exclusively on the Court's
own precedents, rather than on an independent examination of
tradition in the states.68
Writing in Moore, Justice Powell noted that "[o]ur decisions
establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition. 69 Moreover, Justice Powell
stated that "[a]ppropriate limits on substantive due process come
not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful 'respect for
the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values
that underlie our society."'7 ' Earlier precedents, however, rather
interest"); see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-85 (1978).
66. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,684-
85 (1977) ("While the outer limits [of the right of privacy] have not been marked by the
Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified
government interference are personal decisions 'relating to marriage." (quoting Loving, 388
U.S. at 1, 12)).
67. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-97 (1987) (holding that the right to marry,
recognized in prior cases, extends to persons incarcerated in state prisons); Zablocki, 434
U.S. at 383-84 (arguing that "[m]ore recent decisions have established that the right to marry
is part of the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause" and observing that "[c]ases subsequent to Griswold and Loving have
routinely categorized the decision to marry as among the personal decisions protected by the
right of privacy).
68. See 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1977) (plurality opinion).
69. Id. at 503.
70. Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
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than an abstract review of historical evidence, constituted the legal
source of the right of privacy: "Decisions concerning child rearing,
which Yoder, Meyer, Pierce, and other cases have recognized as
entitled to constitutional protection, long have been shared with
grandparents or other relatives who occupy the same house-
hold-indeed who may take on major responsibility for the rearing
of the children.'
Over the past several terms, the Supreme Court also has started
looking to the law of foreign jurisdictions to ascertain relevant legal
traditions. Foreign law could constitute a fifth means of defining
"tradition" for purposes of substantive due process. In Atkins v.
Virginia, for example, the Justices looked to the substantive law of
the European Union and to the "Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and
Buddhist traditions" when considering whether execution of
mentally retarded persons transgresses "evolving standards of
decency" under the Eighth Amendment. 2
Chief Justice Rehnquist objected that the majority had "place[d]
weight on foreign laws, the views of professional and religious
organizations, and opinion polls in reaching its conclusion."73 In a
substantially less reserved dissent, Justice Scalia inveighed that
"the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national
consensus' must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote)
to the views of assorted professional and religious organizations,
members of the so-called 'world community,' and respondents to
opinion polls. ' 74 In Justice Scalia's view, "the practices of the 'world
community"' are "irrelevant" to interpreting the Eighth Amendment
because these nations maintain "notions of justice [that] are
(thankfully) not always those of our people.7 5 Quoting an earlier
dissent, Scalia insisted that "[w]here there is not first a settled
consensus among our own people, the views of other nations,
however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to
be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.7 6
judgment)).
71. Id. at 505.
72. 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21, 321 (2002).
73. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 347-48.
76. Id. at 348 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988)).
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Neither Chief Justice Rehnquist nor Justice Scalia defined
precisely how they would approach the "consensus" or "tradition"
inquiry. Justice Scalia, in another context, has made clear that a
tradition exists in his view only when, searching for the most
narrow relevant legal tradition, the practices of the states support
the autonomy claim."7 Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand,
has endorsed a consistent history approach to defining tradition.78
II. EXPLORING THE SUPREME COURT'S METHODOLOGIES FOR
APPLYING THE TRADITION TEST
Having briefly sketched the principal methodologies that the
Supreme Court has deployed to define "tradition," this Part will
explore each methodology in greater detail and offer a critique of
the methodology as a means of limiting the scope of substantive due
process. Ideally, the test, or tests, used to define the tradition
inquiry would be capable of predictable application not only by the
Supreme Court, but also by the lower federal and state courts. If
the tradition inquiry is to serve as more than a mere Dumbo's
feather, it must constrain discretion in a meaningful and predict-
able way. Some of the approaches advance these values more
effectively than others.
A. Reviewing English and Early American Legal Sources: The
"Tradition Ascertained Through Original Intent" Approach
Since the turn of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has
looked to the original understanding of the Framers when faced
with substantive due process challenges. In Twining v. New Jersey,
for example, the Justices had to decide whether the Fifth Amend-
ment's privilege against self-incrimination applied to the states.79
77. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion).
78. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) ("We begin, as we do in all
due process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices.").
79. 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908) ('The general question, therefore, is, whether such a law
[allowing adverse inferences based on a defendant's refusal to testify at trial] violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, either by abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States, or by depriving persons of their life, liberty or property without due process
of law."), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964).
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The Twining Court noted that the privilege is "universal in
American law" and that "[a]t the time of the formation of the Union
the principle that no person could be compelled to be a witness
against himself had become embodied in the common law and
distinguished it from all other systems of jurisprudence."' Thus,
the most immediately relevant consideration in deciding whether
due process incorporates the privilege against self-incrimination in
a criminal proceeding was the actual practice of the states at the
time of the Constitution's framing:
What is due process of law may be ascertained by an examina-
tion of those settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in
the common and statute law of England before the emigration
of our ancestors, and shown not to have been unsuited to their
civil and political condition by having been acted on by them
after the settlement of this country."'
This is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. If English common
law established the requirements of due process, "the procedure of
the first half of the seventeenth century would be fastened upon the
American jurisprudence like a straightjacket, only to be unloosed
by constitutional amendment."82
The Twining Court articulated a more open-ended general test
for substantive due process claims: "Is [the right in question] a
fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the
very idea of free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen
of such a government?" 3 Put differently, the right at issue must be
"an immutable principle of justice."8 4 After examining the history of
the privilege against self-incrimination in the common law of the
United Kingdom and in the states, the majority found the historical
record mixed. 5 Its "survey [did] not tend to show that it was then
in this country the universal or even general belief that the
privilege ranked among the fundamental and inalienable rights of
80. Id.
81. Id. at 100.
82. Id. at 101.
83. Id. at 106.
84. Id. at 113.
85. See id. at 107-10.
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mankind," but rather "it affirmatively shows that the privilege was
not conceived to be inherent in due process of law, but ... a right
separate, independent and outside of due process."86 Moreover, the
Court stated that "[e]ven if the historical meaning of due process of
law and the decisions of this court did not exclude the privilege
from it, it would be going far to rate it as an immutable principle of
justice which is the inalienable possession of every citizen of a free
government.""7 Thus, the Twining test conducts an abstract inquiry
into the relation of the asserted right to any system of justice
observing the rule of law. If it is possible to imagine any system of
justice that fails to recognize the right, the right's historical
pedigree will not result in its incorporation against the states via
the Due Process Clause.88
Almost thirty years later, in Palko v. Connecticut, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed this approach. Writing for the majority, Justice
Cardozo rejected the claim that the privilege against double
jeopardy applied to the states as an incident of due process of law. 9
He framed the test as whether the privilege against double jeopardy
is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and explained that
only rights constituting "the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty" inhere in the concept of due process of law. 0 Such rights
have such a legal, social, and cultural importance that "neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."91 The Court
86. Id. at 110.
87. Id. at 113.
88. See, e.g., id. ("It has no place in the jurisprudence of civilized and free countries
outside the domain of the common law, and it is nowhere observed among our own people in
the search for truth outside the administration of the law.").
89. 302 U.SI 319, 328 (1937) ("Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has
subjected him a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it? ... The
answer surely must be 'no."), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
90. Id. at 325.
91. Id. at 326. Another 1930s case, Snyder v. Massachusetts, offered a slightly different
test: a state "is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own
conception of policy and fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934), overruled inpart by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964). In Snyder, the
defendant was not allowed to accompany the jury on a viewing of the crime scene; Snyder
claimed that this violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. See id. at 103-06.
In rejecting this claim, Justice Cardozo considered trial practice involving jury trips to crime
scenes from the colonial period to the present and concluded that no firmly established rule
existed that the defendant has a right to accompany the jury on such visits: "Whether a
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provided that "[tihis is true, for illustration, of freedom of thought,
and speech."92
In Palko, the Supreme Court did not even bother to examine in
detail the history of government appeals of jury verdicts resulting
in either acquittal or conviction of a lesser included offense, as was
the case in Palko. Because the Connecticut statute permitting a
prosecutor to appeal a conviction required a showing of error in the
initial trial, it did not present the specter of the state appealing a
verdict in a trial "free from error" with the state attempting "to try
the accused over again."" The statute at issue "asks no more than
this, that the case against him shall go on until there shall be a
trial free from the corrosion of substantial legal error." 4 Justice
Cardozo argued that "[t]his is not cruelty at all, nor even vexation
in any immoderate degree."95 Palko probably saw the matter
somewhat less charitably: having been acquitted of capital murder
but convicted of murder in the second degree in his initial trial, his
retrial resulted in conviction of first degree murder and a death
sentence.96
Ultimately, the Supreme Court overturned both Palko97 and
Twining" and incorporated the constitutional guarantees against
self-incrimination and double jeopardy against the states as
incidents of due process of law. This was not, however, a function
of a change in the Justices' views regarding the mere theoretical
possibility of a system of criminal justice that lacked a privilege
against self-incrimination or a rule against double jeopardy.
Instead, the Supreme Court intentionally shifted the standard away
from an abstract inquiry into principles of justice and toward a
defendant must be present at a view has been considered in the state courts with varying
conclusions." Id. at 108-14, 118-20. In light of this lack of a consistent practice, Justice
Cardozo concluded that the Court would not "supersede [state courts] on the ground that
they deny the essentials of a trial because opinions may differ as to their policy or fairness."
Id. at 122. The Snyder Court's test and methodology are entirely consistent with the
approach in Palko.
92. Palko, 302 U.S. at 326.
93. Id. at 328.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 321-22.
97. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-95 (1969).
98. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11
(1964).
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more focused inquiry looking at the legal experience of the United
States.
Although Warren Court opinions prior to 1968 reflect this shift
in focus, Duncan v. Louisiana99 made express what had been largely
implicit: Anglo-American legal traditions, rather than concepts
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," would set the metes and
bounds of substantive due process protection. 00 Duncan presented
the question of whether the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by
jury applied against the states as an incident of substantive due
process.' In deciding the question, Justice White substantially
refocused the relevant inquiry into tradition: "The question thus is
whether given this [common law] system a particular procedure is
fundamental-whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an
Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty."' 2 Even though "[a]
criminal process which was fair and equitable but used no juries is
easy to imagine," the fact remained that "no American State has
undertaken to construct such a system.'' 3
Accordingly, in analyzing whether a right to a jury trial is
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Justice White, writing
for the Duncan majority, looked to English practice at the time of
the framing and before, to the practice of the colonies, and to the
practice of the states in the early years of the republic.' °4 He
found that "[t]he constitutions adopted by the original States
guaranteed jury trial," as did "the constitution of every State
entering the Union thereafter in one form or another."' 5 Justice
White concluded that "[e]ven such skeletal history is impressive
support for considering the right to jury trial in criminal cases to
99. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
100. Id. at 149 n.14.
101. Id. at 145.
102. Id. at 149 n.14; see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 372 n.9 (1972) (Powell,
J., concurring) (noting agreement with Duncan's "departure from earlier decisions" based on
"a change in focus in the Court's approach to due process," and describing a shift away from
"focusing alone on the element in question and ascertaining whether a system of criminal
justice might be imagined in which a fair trial could be afforded in the absence of that
particular element" in favor of focusing"on the fundamentality of that element viewed in the
context of the basic Anglo-American jurisprudential system common to the States").
103. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 n.14.
104. See id. at 151-56.
105. Id. at 153.
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be fundamental to our system of justice, an importance frequently
recognized in the opinions of this Court."
10 6
In re Winship" ' arguably represents the "poster child" decision
for using Anglo-American legal tradition to establish the scope of
substantive due process. Winship presented the question of whether
New York State could abandon the "guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt" burden of proof in certain juvenile criminal proceedings.'
New York law permitted a bench trial at which the judge was
required to find that the state proved the facts relevant to the crime
by "a preponderance of the evidence."'0 9 Justice Brennan began his
analysis of the issue for the six-to-three majority by noting that
"[t]he requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years
as a Nation.""' He explained that the standard had been in place
no later than 1798 and that states and the federal government had
observed it scrupulously ever since: "Although virtually unanimous
adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard in common-law
jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a requirement of
due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment
about the way in which law should be enforced and justice adminis-
tered.""" Justice Brennan also noted that numerous Supreme
Court opinions, released over an extended period of time, assumed
that the reasonable doubt standard was a mandatory element of the
American criminal justice system. 12 Finally, the standard advanced
the crucial objective of "reducing the risk of convictions resting on
factual error."113
106. Id. at 153-54. For evidence of the continuing importance of the jury trial to the
contemporary Supreme Court, see Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which
invalidated Washington State's sentencing guidelines because the guidelines permitted
upward departures in sentencing based on facts not submitted to jury determination, and
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held that any fact used to justify
imposition of an enhanced sentence must be presented and proved to a jury.
107. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
108. Id. at 358, 360.
109. See id. at 360-61 (quoting the N.Y. Family Court Act § 744(b), which required that
"[a]ny determination" regarding a juvenile defendant's guilt "must be based on a
preponderance of the evidence").
110. Id. at 361.
111. Id. at 361-62 (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155).
112. See id. at 362-63.
113. Id. at 363.
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Although the Constitution never mentions the reasonable doubt
standard, because of its deep roots in American law, the majority
found it to be required as an incident of the Due Process Clauses.
As Justice Brennan wrote, "[1]est there remain any doubt about
the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we
explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.""' 4 Moreover, New York could not establish any offsetting
benefits associated with abandoning the standard only in the
context of juvenile offender cases."5
Winship is particularly significant because no express constitu-
tional provision requires observance of the reasonable doubt
standard; the standard is a matter of longstanding tradition and
state governments have almost uniformly observed it. The question
faced by the Supreme Court was whether a longstanding practice
had morphed into a freestanding, nontextual, constitutional right.
The majority's methodology builds a very strong case for recognition
of an unenumerated fundamental right: the rule has roots dating
back to the colonial period; all the states have observed the rule
since that time; the Supreme Court's own precedents, over a
substantial period of time, assume the constitutional status of
the rule; and New York has failed to proffer a compelling, or even
substantial, reason for abandoning the rule in the context of
juvenile criminal proceedings. Indeed, the proof beyond reasonable
doubt standard arguably presents the strongest case possible for
the recognition and protection of an unenumerated constitutional
right.
Justice John Marshall Harlan, one of the principal proponents
of the use of due process to protect rights enjoying the imprimatur
of history," 6 filed a concurring opinion. He engaged in a more
thorough historical overview, but reached the same conclusion as
Justice Brennan. Harlan explained the absence of a prior precedent
establishing the constitutional status of the standard as a function
of its longstanding nature and almost uniform observance:
114. Id. at 364.
115. See id. at 367-68.
116. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 684-86 (1966) (Harlan,
J., dissenting); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 540-45, 550-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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It is only because of the nearly complete and long-standing
acceptance of the reasonable-doubt standard by the States in
criminal trials that the Court has not before today had to hold
explicitly that due process, as an expression of fundamental
procedural fairness, requires a more stringent standard for
criminal trials than for ordinary civil litigation.
1 17
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Stewart, agreed that the
reasonable doubt standard applies to criminal cases, but rejected
the proposition that a juvenile court was the same thing as a
criminal court: "I cannot regard it as a manifestation of progress to
transform juvenile courts into criminal courts, which is what we are
well on the way to accomplishing."1 '
Only Justice Hugo Black dissented generally from the proposition
that in a criminal proceeding, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to observe the reason-
able doubt burden of proof: "The Constitution thus goes into some
detail to spell out what kind of trial a defendant charged with crime
should have, and I believe the Court has no power to add to or
subtract from the procedures set forth by the Founders.""' 9 Justice
Black feared the dangers of an open-ended judicial power to
invalidate state and federal laws under the rubric of due process. 20
His answer was to incorporate, lock, stock, and barrel, the first
eight amendments to the Constitution:
I realize that it is far easier to substitute individual judges' ideas
of "fairness" for the fairness prescribed by the Constitution, but
I shall not at any time surrender my belief that that document
itself should be our guide, not our own concept of what is fair,
decent, and right.' 2 '
117. Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting).
120. See, e.g., Harper, 383 U.S. at 675-76 (Black, J., dissenting) (I have heretofore had
many occasions to express my strong belief that there is no constitutional support whatever
for this Court to use the Due Process Clause as though it provided a blank check to alter the
meaning of the Constitution as written so as to add to it substantive constitutional changes
which a majority of the Court at any given time believes are needed to meet present-day
problems.').
121. Winship, 397 U.S. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting); see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
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In Black's view, the majority's approach was nothing more than the
"old 'shock-the-conscience' test" rather "than the words of the
Constitution."'22 Black admitted that
a strong, persuasive argument can be made for a standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases-and the
majority has made that argument well-but it is not for me as
a judge to say for that reason that Congress or the States are
without constitutional power to establish another standard that
the Constitution does not otherwise forbid. 123
He also conceded that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt has long
been required in federal criminal trials," and that "this requirement
is almost universally found in the governing laws of the States.' 24
But neither of these facts should preclude "a State through its duly
constituted legislative branch" from deciding "to apply a different
standard.' 25
Winship is where the rubber hits the road for opponents of
substantive due process: if the federal courts truly have no legiti-
mate power to recognize and protect unenumerated, nontextual
constitutional rights, then Winship was wrongly decided. Winship,
however, has never been subjected to the kind of intense scrutiny
and critical commentary that decisions like Roe 26 and Griswold 21
have suffered. This is probably so because the legal and cultural
assumption of a reasonable doubt standard in criminal proceedings
is so firmly grounded in our society that abolition of the standard,
absent the most extraordinary justifications, seems unthink-
able-not only to liberals or libertarians, but also to conservatives.
One might predict that such a deeply rooted right would face few,
if any, real legislative threats. But this underestimates the power
46, 89-90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9
(1964).
122. Winship, 397 U.S. at 377.
123. Id. at 385.
124. Id. at 385-86.
125. Id. at 386.
126. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see generally John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
127. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OFAMERIcA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OFTHE LAw 95-100,110-11,169-70, 262-64
(1990).
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of the perceived emergency. 12 In the aftermath of September 11,
2001, would it have been unthinkable that Congress might create
terrorism crimes and lower the standard of proof necessary to
obtain a conviction? In Winship, New York's legislature abandoned
the standard for criminal proceedings involving juveniles-a
circumstance that seems much less compelling than the threat of
terrorist attacks in the United States. Justice Brennan, in Winship,
defined the state's interest as obtaining a factually accurate verdict.
One would hope that a future Justice would view efforts to suspend
or repeal the reasonable doubt standard from the same vantage
point. The fact remains, however, that Justice Black's approach is
the only principled approach open to a person who opposes any and
all recognition of unenumerated, nontextual constitutional rights.
If you believe Winship was rightly decided, then you have conceded
the legitimacy of substantive due process-one can argue about the
scope of the doctrine, but not its very existence.
In sum, Winship presents a very strong case for using history and
tradition to recognize unenumerated constitutional rights. The
methodology has three points of focus: legal practice at the time of
the framing, consistent observance over time, and recognition in
prior precedents. This is probably the least open-ended test for the
recognition of unenumerated fundamental rights; it is perhaps not
surprising, then, that the Supreme Court has articulated and
applied broader tests. Under the Winship test, if strictly applied, a
number of substantive due process cases were wrongly decided
-notably including Griswold, Eisenstadt, Moore, Roe, and, most
recently, Lawrence. Moreover, the Bowers majority probably
reached the right result, if substantive due process protects rights
only when the claimed right existed at the time of the framing, has
been consistently observed, and enjoys recognition of some sort in
existing case law.
128. See Bruce Ackerman, Essay, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1029
(2004). See generally Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985) (suggesting courts should "equip the [F]irst [A]mendment to
do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most
prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent
systematically").
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B. Counting States
A second discrete methodology places less emphasis on history
and more emphasis on contemporary practices. In several landmark
substantive due process cases, the Supreme Court has resorted to
counting states to determine whether a consensus exists regarding
the existence of an asserted fundamental right. State counting looks
to the contemporary and past content of state statutory law and
common law doctrine to ascertain if a tradition, defined by consen-
sus among the states, exists.129 If no state permits conviction of a
crime on less than a proof-beyond-reasonable-doubt standard, the
count would be fifty-to-zero. In the Lawrence case, four states
prohibited same-sex sodomy and nine additional states prohibited
sodomy generally. 30 On those facts, the state count was either
forty-six to four, or thirty-seven to thirteen."' Justice Kennedy
engaged in state counting in Lawrence,'32 just as Justice White did
in Bowers.'33 At no point, however, has the Supreme Court ever
explained how state counting works or when recourse to state
counting should be had. 134
Justice John Marshall Harlan, in his famous Poe v. Ullman
dissent, emphasized the importance of "having regard to what
history teaches are the traditions from which [this nation] devel-
oped as well as the traditions from which it broke.'' 35 In his view,
"[that tradition is a living thing."136 Although this language
possesses great rhetorical power, it does not go very far in
129. For a trenchant description and critique of state counting as a means of interpreting
provisions of the federal Constitution, see generally Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unravelling of
Federalism: The illogic of Using State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National
Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089 (2006).
130. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) (noting that all states prohibited
sodomy until 1961 and that twenty-four states continued to prohibit sodomy at the time of
that decision), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
134. Professor Jacobi makes much of this fact, particularly in the context of the Eighth
Amendment. See Jacobi, supra note 129, at 1092-93, 1099-105. She suggests that "[r]eliance
on state legislation is the least principled and least logical alternative available to the Court."
Id. at 1104. For reasons that Part III develops, this conclusion is profoundly mistaken.
135. 367 U.S. 497, 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
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operationalizing tradition as a test for the scope of substantive due
process: precisely how should federal courts identify the "traditions
from which [we] have developed" and those "from which [we] have
broke[n]"?'37
Recourse to original intent-to the practices of the colonies, of the
states in the early Republic, and. of the federal government
itself-provides strong evidence of the traditions from which we
have come; at the same time, however, such evidence says abso-
lutely nothing about the traditions from which we have broken. For
example, consistent observance of the reasonable doubt standard in
criminal trials creates a powerful argument that a state cannot
modify or repeal this standard absent a remarkably compelling
justification. Similarly, the common law's consistent treatment of
unwanted medical attention as a battery3 8 also creates a strong
basis for disallowing efforts to force unwanted medical treatment
on individual citizens absent the most exigent circumstances.
3 9
In sum, careful historical analysis, coupled with careful case
analysis, should yield concrete answers when a court inquires into
the traditions from which we have come. That said, this methodol-
ogy will tell us nothing about the traditions from which we have
broken (for example, the doctrine of coverture)--or traditions that
we are in the process of abandoning (for example, the proscription
against marijuana use in compassionate use cases). It also would be
odd to define tradition solely by reference to the social norms of
1789 or 1868. Indeed, were the Supreme Court to take this
approach in a consistent fashion, the only way to keep the Constitu-
tion socially relevant would be to resort to much more frequent
amending. 140
137. See id.
138. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1990) (recognizing a
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment and noting that "[a]t common law,
even the touching of one person by another without consent and without legal justification
was a battery"). The Cruzan Court recognized that "[t]he principle that a competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may
be inferred from our prior decisions." Id. at 278.
139. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905) (holding that substantive
due process does not prohibit a state from requiring all persons to be vaccinated against a
communicable disease, notwithstanding a strong liberty interest in the control over one's own
person).
140. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 303-04 (1991); see also Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934) ("It is no answer to say that this public need
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Counting states provides perhaps the most persuasive rationale
for finding that "We the People" have broken from a preexisting
tradition. When states move rapidly to repeal proscriptions against
a particular behavior, do so over a relatively short period of time,
and move in a single direction, in lock step, a strong argument
exists that a new tradition has been established. For example, the
collection of poll taxes has deep roots in Anglo-American law and
most states, at one time, maintained poll taxes as a restriction on
suffrage.' 4 ' Justice Harlan explained:
It is also arguable, indeed it was probably accepted as sound
political theory by a large percentage of Americans through
most of our history, that people with some property have a
deeper stake in community affairs, and are consequently more
responsible, more educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy
of confidence, than those without means, and that the commu-
nity and Nation would be better managed if the franchise were
restricted to such citizens.142
was not apprehended a century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution
meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement
that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day, it is intended
to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which
the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the
statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception that
Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning-We must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding."').
141. See generally KIRK H. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 77-111
(Greenwood Press 1969) (1918) (chronicling gradual abandonment of property restrictions
in favor of universal suffrage for white males twenty-one and older); CHILTON WILLIAMSON,
AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTYTO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860 (1960) (detailing ubiquity
of property qualifications for voting at the time of the framing and chronicling gradual
abandonment of such restrictions in favor of universal suffrage for white males twenty-one
and older). Indeed, at the time of the framing of the U.S. Constitution, many states limited
suffrage not only to free white men, but also maintained property qualifications on suffrage;
thus, being free, white, and twenty-one years of age did not ensure voting rights, in states
such as Virginia or South Carolina, in 1789. See FREDERIC D. OGDEN, THE POLL TAX IN THE
SOUTH 2 (1958); 1 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE, 1776-1850, at 92-97 (F.B. Rothman 1994) (1898).
142. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,685 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
see also Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 281, 283-84 (1937) ("Levy by the poll has long
been a familiar form of taxation, much used in some countries and to a considerable extent
here, at first in the Colonies and later in the States.... The payment of poll taxes as a
prerequisite to voting is a familiar and reasonable regulation long enforced in many States
and for more than a century in Georgia."), overruled by Harper, 383 U.S: at 669.
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Thus, even if all white male citizens had the theoretical ability to
vote, only those willing and able to pay the poll tax could actually
cast a ballot.
Over time, restrictions on suffrage fell-first property qualifica-
tions,'43 then racial restrictions,' then gender limitations, 45 and
finally the abolition of the poll tax for federal elections.'46 It is true,
of course, that the Twenty-fourth Amendment did not purport to
address poll taxes for state and local elections; its drafters could
have written the amendment more broadly but chose not to do so.
Accordingly, when Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections4 v
came before the Supreme Court, the trend line of change was
reasonably clear: over time, restrictions on voting were abolished,
both legislatively and via formal constitutional amendments. The
question before the Supreme Court was whether the continued
application of a poll tax, when measured against the consistent
pattern of law reform in this area, could stand.4 ' In answering this
question, the Court "conclude[d] that a State violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes
the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral
standard."'49
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, noted that "[o]nly a
handful of States today condition the franchise on the payment of
a poll tax."5 ' Specifically, only five states maintained a poll tax in
1966, 5' and one of those states repealed the tax after the case had
been argued before the Court.'52 This forty-five to five verdict-a
143. See supra note 141.
144. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.").
145. See id. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or .abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
146. See id. amend. XXIV, § 1 ('The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any
primary or other election ... shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State
by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.").
147. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
148. Id. at 664.
149. Id. at 666.
150. Id. at 666 n.4.
151. The states included Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. See id.
152. Id. ('Vermont has recently eliminated the requirement that poll taxes be paid in
order to vote.").
2006] 955
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
forty-six to four verdict by the time of the Court's decision-against
the maintenance of poll taxes for state and local elections created
a strong presumption against their continued existence. 113 The
states maintaining poll taxes could not offer very weighty rationales
for their continued existence. Moreover, in the Court's view "[v]oter
qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying
this or any other tax."'154 This is because "[w]ealth, like race, creed,
or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently
in the electoral process.' 55
Harper presents a very strong case for invalidation based on state
counting: when forty-six states abandon a practice that burdens the
exercise of a fundamental right like voting, and the general fabric
of the law reflects a consistent pattern of ever-expanding enfran-
chisement, the Supreme Court's claim that it should force
nonconsenting states to abandon their long-held position seems
reasonably strong. 5 ' Counting states, the four remaining outlier
states-Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia-were required
to give up their preferred legal rule because an overwhelming
national consensus had developed against it; the right to vote could
not be committed to the "laboratories of experimentation"" 7 at least
insofar as payment of a poll tax was concerned. To be sure, a
broader version of the Twenty-fourth Amendment would have been
a better means of establishing a conclusive presumption against
poll taxes in all circumstances. Nevertheless, when forty-six states
abandon a practice once universally observed, no state adopts or re-
enacts the practice, contemporary two-thirds majorities of both
houses of Congress and three-fourths of the state legislatures
permanently abolish the practice in an important subset of cases
153. See supra notes 150-52.
154. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
155. Id. at 668.
156. See Althouse, supra note 58, at 1746-47 (arguing that after a clear national consensus
emerges, states failing to embrace that consensus "have begun to appear as laggards, no
longer serving any beneficial purpose by maintaining their differences, but only depriving
their citizens of the greater good").
157. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Mhe
States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions
where the best solution is far from clear."); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that
a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
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(all elections for federal office), a compelling argument exists that
poll taxes are a tradition with which we have broken as a people.15
Indeed, a thirty-eight to twelve division of the states should
arguably be sufficient to establish that a consensus has developed
against any particular practice or regulation.'59 In Harper, the
Supreme Court effectively declared the period of experimentation
to be over. This is not to say that, going forward, a state might
never reenact a poll tax, but to do so constitutionally the state
would be required to satisfy a heightened level of judicial
scrutiny. 160
Justices Black and Harlan dissented in Harper. Each opinion
offered a different objection to state counting as a means of limiting
state-imposed burdens on fundamental rights. Justice Black
objected to the Supreme Court forcing nonconsenting states to
abandon a practice not proscribed by any specific constitutional
text. He stated, "[one] reason for my dissent from the Court's
judgment and opinion is that it seems to be using the old 'natural-
law-due-process formula' to justify striking down state laws as
violations of the Equal Protection Clause."' 1 The state election
reform movement was irrelevant to Justice Black:
Moreover, when a "political theory" embodied in our Constitu-
tion becomes outdated, it seems to me that a majority of the nine
members of this Court are not only without constitutional power
but are far less qualified to choose a new constitutional political
theory than the people of this country proceeding in the manner
provided by Article V. 62
Justice Harlan, on the other hand, believed that the long history
of poll taxes made them presumptively valid, notwithstanding the
158. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
159. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Court did not insist on a thirty-eight
to twelve division, but instead found a thirty-twenty split among the states probative
evidence against the imposition of the death penalty on minors. Id. at 564-67.
160. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 670 (Black, J., dissenting) ("We have long been mindful that
where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause,
classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully
confined.").
161. Id. at 675 (quoting Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90 (1946) (Black, J.,
dissenting), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964)).
162. Id. at 678.
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Twenty-fourth Amendment and the strong consensus against such
taxes reflected by the decision of forty-six states voluntarily to
abandon the practice for state and local elections.163 Accordingly, he
stated that "it is only by fiat that it can be said, especially in the
context of American history, that there can be no rational debate as
to their advisability.' 16 4 Even though "[p]roperty and poll-tax
qualifications, very simply, are not in accord with current egalitar-
ian notions of how a modern democracy should be organized,"
Justice Harlan argued that:
it is all wrong, in my view, for the Court to adopt the political
doctrines popularly accepted at a particular moment of our
history and to declare all others to be irrational and invidious,
barring them from the range of choice by reasonably minded
people acting through the political process.'65
Because of the long tradition of imposing property qualifications
and poll taxes on would-be voters, Justice Harlan thought the
obvious law reform trend irrelevant. This view, however, grossly
disserved his own observation in Poe v. Ullman that the Supreme
Court has an obligation to identify and respect not only the
traditions from which we have come, but also those traditions with
which we have broken.'66 If, as Harlan wrote, "tradition is a living
thing,"'67 there must be room for substantive due process doctrine
to take account of the new as well as the old.
Justice Harlan's strict insistence on a preexisting tradition
going back to the time of the framing would unduly limit the
Supreme Court's updating function and, in all probability, force
greater reliance on the amending process to maintain the vitality
of the Constitution. His approach has the benefit of restricting
the scope of substantive due process in a very concrete way, but
this benefit constitutes a shortcoming too. 6 ' Effectively, although
163. Id. at 684-86 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Property qualifications and poll taxes have
been a traditional part of our political structure.').
164. Id. at 684.
165. Id. at 686.
166. 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 542.
168. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1952) ("To believe that this judicial
exercise of judgment could be avoided by freezing 'due process of law' at some fixed stage of
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acknowledging that we break from traditions, he would require
recognition of such breaks to come solely through the legislative
process. Perhaps his intention in Poe was to establish a bifurcated
system in which federal courts enforce the traditions from which we
have come, but not those from which we have broken. This is not
the most natural reading of his language, nor does it address why
courts should have primacy in identifying and enforcing old
traditions but not newer ones.
To be sure, the problem of false positives is more acute with
respect to identifying traditions from which we have broken; but
this would seem to relate to the appropriate level of scrutiny the
court should bring to bear on state regulations burdening the
interest, rather than to the question of whether judicial enforce-
ment of the interest should exist at all. Thus, courts might apply
a less demanding test on regulations affecting relatively new
rights, while applying a more demanding standard for regulations
burdening more deeply established rights.
C. Using Past Precedents as Proof of an Existing Tradition
In several major substantive due process cases, the Supreme
Court has invoked its own past precedents as conclusive evidence
of a tradition justifying heightened protection of an unenumerat-
ed right. For example, in Troxel v. Granville, a case involving a
Washington State statute that permitted state trial courts to
order third-party visitation rights over a custodial biological
parent's objection, the Court cited earlier precedents, going back to
Meyer v. Nebraska'69 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,17° to establish
a tradition of parental control over raising children.' 7 '
Writing for a plurality, Justice O'Connor explained that "[t]he
liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest
of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.' 72
time or thought is to suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional adjudication
is a function for inanimate machines and not for judges.").
169. 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923).
170. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
171. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000) (plurality opinion).
172. Id. at 65.
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After invoking Meyer and Pierce, she observed that "[i] n subsequent
cases also, we have recognized the fundamental right of parents to
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children."' v She concluded that "[iun light of this extensive prece-
dent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children."'74
Justice Scalia was the only member of the Supreme Court who
rejected the existence of an unenumerated fundamental right to
oversee the upbringing of one's children:
[W]hile I would think it entirely compatible with the commit-
ment to representative democracy set forth in the founding
documents to argue, in legislative chambers or in electoral
campaigns, that the State has no power to interfere with
parents' authority over the rearing of their children, I do not
believe that the power which the Constitution confers upon me
as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my
view) infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated
right.175
For Justice Scalia, the Court's prior cases in this area represented
a hodgepodge stemming from "an era rich in substantive due
process holdings that have since been repudiated,"'76 undeserving
of stare decisis effect. 1
77
For eight members of the Supreme Court, both in the majority
and in dissent, however, the prior cases were a sufficient predicate
for recognition and enforcement of an unenumerated right to auto-
173. Id. at 65-66.
174. Id. The plurality went on to invalidate the Washington statute, finding that, "as
applied to Granville and her family in this case, [the law] unconstitutionally infringes on that
fundamental parental right." Id. at 67.
175. Id. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 92.
177. See id.('The sheer diversity of today's opinions persuades me that the theory of
unenumerated parental rights underlying these ... cases has small claim to stare decisis
protection. A legal principle that can be thought to produce such diverse outcomes in the
relatively simple case before us here is not a legal principle that has induced substantial
reliance.').
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nomy in child rearing. 7 ' Not one member of the Court thought it
necessary to demonstrate the continuing existence of a community
tradition of deference to parental decision making over matters
associated with raising a child. Nor was Troxel unique in its use of
prior precedent to establish the existence of a tradition, and thereby
triggering enhanced constitutional protection for an unenumerated
right. In fact, the Justices have used this technique in a number
of landmark cases, including Moore v. City of East Cleveland,' 9
Zablocki v. Redhail,8 ° and Griswold v. Connecticut.'' Although
178. See id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that "[wle have long
recognized that a parent's interests in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and
custody of children are generally protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment" and citing cases); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting
that the Supreme Court has recognized "a fundamental right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children" and resting this right on prior cases); id. at 87 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Our cases leave no doubt that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in
caring for and guiding their children, and a corresponding privacy interest-absent
exceptional circumstances-in doing so without the undue interference of strangers to them
and to their child.'); id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("As our case law has developed, the
custodial parent has a constitutional right to determine, without undue interference by the
State, how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child.").
179. 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("Appropriate limits on substantive due
process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful 'respect for the
teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.' Our
decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because
the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)); see also id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
and applying Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), in support of constitutional
protection for the "private realm of family life").
180. 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) ("Since our past decisions make clear that the right to marry
is of fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue here significantly
interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe that 'critical examination' of the state
interests advanced in support of the classification is required." (citing Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 314 (1976))); id. at 392-93 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("The Constitution does not specifically mention freedom to marry, but it is settled
that the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
embraces more than those freedoms expressly enumerated in the Bill of Rights. And the
decisions of this Court have made clear that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties so protected." (citations omitted)); cf. id. at 407
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (ignoring prior cases and declaring "that under the Equal
Protection Clause the statute need pass only the 'rational basis test,' and that under the Due
Process Clause it need only be shown that it bears a rational relation to a constitutionally
permissible objective" (citation omitted)).
181. 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965) (reviewing cases involving various constitutional
provisions, including Meyer and Pierce, and holding that "[t]he foregoing cases suggest that
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
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Justice Blackmun made a tepid effort to establish the existence of
an emerging tradition of permitting women to decide whether or not
to terminate a pregnancy,"8 2 his majority opinion in Roe v. Wade
rested the right to terminate a pregnancy almost entirely on prior
substantive due process cases, rather than on a contemporary
tradition of deference with respect to abortion. 8 ' In turn, the
authors of the Casey joint opinion were content to follow Justice
Blackmun's lead:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child rearing, and education. Our cases recognize "the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child." Our precedents '"ave respected the private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter." These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
guarantees that help give them life and substance"); id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(citing and applying Meyer and Pierce as establishing a zone of privacy associated with "the
marital relation and the marital home"); id. at 502 (White, J., concurring in the judgment)
("It would be unduly repetitious, and belaboring the obvious, to expound on the impact of this
statute on the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against arbitrary or
capricious denials or on the nature of this liberty. Suffice it to say that this is not the first
time this Court has had occasion to articulate that the liberty entitled to protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right 'to marry, establish a home, and bring up
children,' and 'the liberty ... to direct the upbringing and education of children,' and that
these are among 'the basic civil rights of man."' (citations omitted)).
182. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139-40 (1973) ("By the end of the 1950's, a large
majority of the jurisdictions banned abortion, however and whenever performed, unless done
to save or preserve the life of the mother.... In the past several years, however, a trend
toward liberalization of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by about one-third of the
States, of less stringent laws, most of them patterned after the ALI Model Penal Code ....").
183. See id. at 152 ('The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In
a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as [1891], the Court has recognized
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist
under the Constitution." (citation omitted)); cf. id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ('The
fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority sentiment in those States,
have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century is a strong indication, it seems to me,
that the asserted right to an abortion is not 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.' Even today, when society's views on abortion are
changing, the very existence of the debate is evidence that the 'right' to an abortion is not so
universally accepted as the appellant would have us believe." (citation omitted)).
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autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
Thus, the joint opinion made little, if any, effort to ground a right
to terminate a pregnancy in the nation's history and traditions.
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist engaged in a more systematic
analysis of "tradition" and reported that "in 1868, at least 28 of the
then-37 States and 8 Territories had statutes banning or limiting
abortion" and "[b]y the turn of the century virtually every State
had a law prohibiting or restricting abortion on its books."'85
Moreover, "21 of the restrictive abortion laws in effect in 1868 were
still in effect in 1973 when Roe was decided, and an overwhelming
majority of the States prohibited abortion unless necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother.""1 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that "[b]y the middle of the [twentieth] century, a
liberalization trend had set in," but still argued that "[o]n this
record, it can scarcely be said that any deeply rooted tradition of
relatively unrestricted abortion in our history supported the
classification of the right to abortion as 'fundamental' under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 87
State supreme courts invalidating state laws prohibiting sodomy
also have used the past precedent methodology: the state supreme
courts cited turn-of-the-century cases from the 1890s and early
1900s recognizing privacy interests, generally in the context of
criminal search and seizure, and then generalized the right of
privacy to encompass consensual acts of sodomy, between adults, in
private. 8 The state supreme and appellate courts probably used
184. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (citations omitted).
185. Id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 175-77 nn.1-2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (reporting and listing
state and territorial laws prohibiting abortion).
186. Casey, 505 U.S. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
187. Id. at 952-53.
188. See Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 345-50 (Ark. 2002) (applying cases decided in
1924, 1973, and 1978 to establish a right of privacy and generalizing "that the fundamental
right to privacy implicit in our law protects all private, consensual, noncommercial acts of
sexual intimacy between adults'); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 21-24, 26 (Ga. 1998)
(invoking and applying Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905),
a decision involving a police search and seizure, to support the conclusion that "it is clear
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precedents, rather than tradition, to establish the contours of the
right of privacy because this approach-generalizing a preexisting
right of privacy to encompass sexual intimacy in the home-
provided a stronger basis for invalidation than an appeal to
tradition. Had Georgia, Kentucky, or Tennessee had an express
right of privacy in its state constitution, this right might have
provided an alternative basis for invalidating the antisodomy laws.
The Montana Supreme Court, interpreting its state constitution,
which contained a textual privacy clause, relied on this clause to
invalidate Montana's antisodomy statute. 189 The court stated that,
"[s]ince the right to privacy is explicit in the Declaration of Rights
in Montana's Constitution, it is a fundamental right and any
legislation regulating the exercise of a fundamental right must be
reviewed under a strict-scrutiny analysis."19
Using prior cases to establish a generalized legal right, then
applying that right to a new set of facts, seems entirely consistent
with the common law methodology of law reform.'91 The weak point
in the logic, of course, is the decision to extend the right to a
that unforced sexual behavior conducted in private between adults is covered by the
principles espoused in Pavesich since such behavior between adults in private is recognized
as a private matter" and concluding that Georgia's anti-sodomy statute, "insofar as it
criminalizes the performance of private, unforced, non-commercial acts of sexual intimacy
between persons legally able to consent" violates "the right of privacy"); Commonwealth v.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,494-98 (Ky. 1993) (citing and applying Commonwealth v. Campbell,
117 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1909), a case involving the possession and use of alcohol in one's home,
which held that "[ilt is not within the competency of government to invade the privacy of a
citizen's life and to regulate his conduct in matters in which he alone is concerned," to
invalidate Kentucky's antisodomy law (emphasis omitted)); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926
S.W.2d 250, 259-61 & n.9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (applying Cravens v. State, 256 S.W. 431
(Tenn. 1923), and Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), to invalidate Tennessee's
antisodomy law).
189. See Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 121-22, 125-26 (Mont. 1997) ('Regardless of
whether Bowers was correctly decided, we have long held that Montana's Constitution
affords citizens broader protection of their right to privacy than does the federal
constitution.... The right of consenting adults, regardless of gender, to engage in private, non-
commercial sexual conduct strikes at the very core of Montana's constitutional right of
individual privacy; and, absent an interest more compelling than a legislative distaste of
what is perceived to be offensive and immoral sexual practices on the part of homosexuals,
state regulation, much less criminalization, of this most intimate social relationship will not
withstand constitutional scrutiny.").
190. Id. at 122.
191. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 146-62 (1982);
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-75, 313-54 (1986).
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behavior that, as a matter of longstanding practice and tradition,
has been subject to government regulation, perhaps up to and
including criminalization. The approach runs the risk of putting
appellate courts ahead of the cultural curve; 19 2 that is to say,
generalizing rights and applying a Millsian harm principle to weigh
the state's interest in regulating will produce decisions that are
deeply counterintuitive to average citizens. 9 ' Moreover, appellate
courts invoking Mill cannot really mean what they appear to say:
no government would really rest its ability to regulate on a
demonstrated showing of affirmative harm to the community.
Government regulates many behaviors that do not necessarily
cause harm to others: for example, marrying a sibling, using
192. For an argument that reliance on past precedents actually facilitates the evolution
of law in a fashion that helps to keep it consistent with cultural norms and expectations, see
Theodore P. Seto, Originalism vs. Precedent: An Evolutionary Perspective, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 2001, 2025-26 (2005) ("The requirement that courts adhere to precedent serves to
preserve the cultural learning embodied in that precedent. As we learn more about rule of
law, equality, liberty, and other fundamental values, our case law comes to reflect that
learning.").
193. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision invalidating that commonwealth's anti-
sodomy law provides a good example. In Commonwealth v. Bonadio, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that "[t]he Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse Statute has only one
possible purpose: to regulate the private conduct of consenting adults." 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa.
1980). This objective "exceeds the valid bounds of the police power while infringing the right
to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and of
this Commonwealth." Id. This was so because, "[w]ith respect to regulation of morals, the
police power should properly be exercised to protect each individual's right to be free from
interference in defining and pursuing his own morality but not to enforce a majority morality
on persons whose conduct does not harm others." Id. The court went on to cite John Stuart
Mill's On Liberty in support of this proposition and to hold that "[t]his philosophy, as applied
to the issue of regulation of sexual morality presently before the Court, or employed to
delimit the police power generally, properly circumscribes state power over the individual."
Id. at 50-51. Of course, the justices could not really mean this; many laws, such as those
involving drug use, rest on cultural and moral distinctions rather than on real differences
in social harm (alcohol and tobacco are acceptable, but marijuana and peyote are not). The
real reason for the court's holding was not a general right of citizens to be free from state
regulation based on morality, but rather the court's assumption of a social consensus that
same-sex intimacy is not socially harmful. See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8-10,82-85,105-07 (2003)
(arguing that cultural norms and expectations play a major role in constitutional
adjudication in general, and particularly in the area of substantive due process). John Stuart
Mill had little, if anything, to do with contemporary attitudes toward sodomy in 1980
Pennsylvania. The opinion would be more persuasive if it provided the real reason for the
outcome: social attitudes had shifted such that same-sex sodomy stood on a different
constitutional footing than the use of heroin.
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marijuana for recreational purposes, committing suicide or
assisting someone else in doing so, and masturbating in a public
park. Such decisions really reflect an assertion about a shift in
cultural and public attitudes regarding the behavior at issue.14
If this is correct, the decisions should be able to point to affirma-
tive evidence that people no longer care about regulating the
behavior at issue. For example, do police actively enforce the laws
in question? Do prosecutors make serious efforts at enforcement
when police arrest someone for the behavior in question? To what
extent does social science data show that average citizens actually
engage in the behavior in question? Arguments premised on social
realities will have more persuasive force than arguments premised
on the idea that government cannot act to advance moral notions.
D. Using Foreign Law To Inform Contemporary Tradition
In recent cases, including Roper, Lawrence, and Atkins, the
Supreme Court has cited foreign legal norms to support an
interpretation of the domestic Constitution. This practice has not
gone unnoticed.' For example, during the recent confirmation
hearings of Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice
Samuel Alito, both judges disavowed the practice in response to
pointed questions from senators.'96 Professor Roger P. Alford has
mounted a sustained attack on the practice. 9 ' Even so, several
members of the Supreme Court appear committed to using foreign
194. See supra note 193.
195. See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty
Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 748-56 (2005) (observing that the Court's decisions in
Lawrence and Roper represented an increased reliance on foreign sources of law); Donald E.
Childress III, Note, Using Comparative Constitutional Law To Resolve Domestic Federal
Questions, 53 DUKE L.J. 193, 193 (2003) ("In Lawrence v. Texas ... the Supreme Court did
what it had never done before in the main body of text in such a momentous case.').
196. See Adam Liptak & Adam Nagourney, Judge Alito the Witness Proves a Powerful
Match for Senate Questioners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at A27 (reporting Chief Justice
Roberts's opposition to citing foreign legal precedents, his view that "[1] ooking at foreign law
for support ... is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends," and Justice
Alto's opposition and view that "I don't think that foreign law is helpful in interpreting the
Constitution").
197. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism,
52 UCLA L. REv. 639 (2005).
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law to inform the scope of domestic constitutional rights-including
unenumerated fundamental rights protected under the doctrine of
substantive due process. 98
In fact, reference to foreign law has been a consistent feature of
U.S. Supreme Court opinions.'99 Most commonly, the Justices'
recourse to foreign law has involved consideration of the domestic
law of the United Kingdom. For example, in deciding the scope of
Congress's subpoena and contempt powers, the Supreme Court
placed extensive reliance on the English practices at the time of
the framing and going forward. 00 In other words, the best way to
understand the Framers' intent with respect to congressional
investigatory powers was to consider the template on which the
Framers modeled Congress: the British Parliament.
Other examples occurred through time. In Twining v. New
Jersey, the Supreme Court invoked the civil law tradition to reject
the claim that the privilege against self-incrimination was "an
immutable principle of justice" and therefore implicit in the concept
of due process.20 ' Thirty years later, when considering whether the
privilege against double jeopardy applies against the state govern-
ments, the Supreme Court cited and applied Twining and once
again invoked continental legal systems: "Compulsory self-incrimi-
nation is part of the established procedure in the law of Continental
Europe."20 2 Writing for the Palko majority, Justice Cardozo posited
that "[flew would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a
fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible" without
198. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73, 576-77 (2003); Childress, supra note
195, at 193-94.
199. See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 195, at 756-877 (chronicling the extensively
restrained use of foreign law in Supreme Court opinions before Lawrence); cf. KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONALLAw 613 (15th ed. 2004) ("Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Lawrence, for the first time in a Supreme Court majority opinion, cited with
approval an authority from European law."); Childress, supra note 195, at 194 (arguing that
by citing "foreign legal precedent-specifically, a decision of the European Court of Human
Rights, as well as examples of the legal culture of other nations-in support of the Court's
ultimate holding," the Supreme Court did something monstrously novel).
200. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 181-90 (1880).
201. 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908) ("It has no place in the jurisprudence of civilized and free
countries outside the domain of the common law, and it is nowhere observed among our own
people in the search for truth outside the administration of the law."), overruled in part by
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964).
202. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,326 n.3 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
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jury trial and initiation of prosecution by grand jury indictment,
and "[w]hat is true of jury trials and indictments is true also, as the
cases show, of the immunity from compulsory self-incrimination. 2 °3
Thus, early substantive due process cases made recourse, in
majority opinions, to foreign law.
All that said, Lawrence does represent a break with past practice,
but the practice at issue--defining fundamental rights with
reference to Anglo-American legal practice and tradition-is of a
considerably more recent vintage than Twining and Palko. In
Duncan v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court undertook a comprehen-
sive review of its efforts to "incorporate," through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, various and sundry provisions
of the Bill of Rights. 4 In describing the process of "selective
incorporation," Justice White noted that, as a general rule, the
Supreme Court
can be seen as having asked, when inquiring into whether some
particular procedural safeguard was required of a State, if a
civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the
particular protection.... The recent cases, on the other hand,
have proceeded upon the valid assumption that state criminal
processes are not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual
systems bearing virtually every characteristic of the common-
law system that has been developing contemporaneously in
England and in this country.
Justice White rejected the "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" test in favor of a test that places greater relative weight on
the actual practices of the United States: 'The question thus is
whether given this kind of system a particular procedure is
fundamental-whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an
Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty. 20 5
In the case at bar, Justice White readily conceded that "[a]
criminal process which was fair and equitable but used no juries is
easy to imagine.... Yet no American State has undertaken to
construct such a system" and "[i]nstead, every American State,
203. Id. at 325 (citing Twining generally).
204. 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
205. Id.
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including [civil law] Louisiana, uses the jury extensively.""2 ° It made
little sense to ask if one could dispense with juries in a civil law
system when no other aspect of a state's criminal justice program
reflected or incorporated an inquisitorial approach to fact finding." '
Justice White emphasized that "the structure and style of the
criminal process-the supporting framework and the subsidiary
procedures-are of the sort that naturally complement jury trial,
and have developed in connection with and in reliance upon jury
trial."'20
This reformulation of the test represents a major conceptual
shift away from the Twining/Palko approach.0 9 If the judicial
inquiry encompasses any theoretical system of justice, recourse to
comparative law materials seems useful, if not absolutely essential.
On the other hand, if the "Anglo-American regime of ordered
liberty" is all that counts, recourse to foreign law seems much less
immediately helpful.210 After all, the best indicator of the domestic
legal tradition would be the laws and practices of the states and the
federal government.
To the extent comparative law might be helpful, the common law
of Great Britain would be the most obvious source of inspiration
and, even then, principally as a means of ascertaining the original
understanding of the Framers. Contemporary law in Great Britain
or in other commonwealth jurisdictions would perhaps have greater
relevance than materials from civil law jurisdictions, but would
stand in a decidedly inferior position vis-A-vis the law in the states.
Lawrence could have potential significance by broadening the
tradition inquiry to encompass contemporary legal practices in
both common law and civil law juridictions. The obvious danger, of
206. Id. at 150 n.14.
207. See MERRYMAN, supra note 40, at 126-30.
208. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 n.14.
209. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 372 n.9 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)
(noting that the "departure from earlier decisions [refusing to incorporate provisions of the
Bill of Rights] was, in large measure, a product of a change in focus in the Court's approach
to due process," and observing that "[n]o longer are questions regarding the constitutionality
of particular criminal procedures resolved by focusing alone on the element in question and
ascertaining whether a system of criminal justice might be imagined in which a fair trial
could be afforded in the absence of that particular element").
210. See id. ("Rather, the focus is, as it should be, on the fundamentality of that element
viewed in the context of the basic Anglo-American jurisprudential system common to the
States.").
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course, is that the history of foreign law in substantive due process
has been an almost exclusively negative one: after finding a
plausible historical case for the recognition of a fundamental right,
judicial recourse to foreign law led the Supreme Court to declare
the history test to have arrived at a false positive.
Justice Scalia recently endorsed just this sort of use of foreign
law, not to recognize new fundamental rights, but rather to reject
them as mere accidents, or false positives:
While "[t]he practices of other nations, particularly other
democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice
uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident,
but rather so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that it
occupies a place not merely in our mores, but, text permitting,
in our Constitution as well," they cannot serve to establish the
first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is
accepted among our people.2 '
211. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,369 n.1 (1989) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969)),
abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005). This was not the only instance
of Justice Scalia using foreign law to reject a constitutional claim. In Schriro v. Summerlin,
542 U.S. 348 (2004), the Supreme Court had to decide if its ruling in Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002), applied retroactively. Ring held that a jury, and not a judge, must decide
whether to impose the death penalty. 536 U.S. at 609. Several states permitted judges to
participate in the sentencing phase of a capital trial; accordingly, if Ring had retroactive
effect, death row inmates sentenced to death by a judge would be entitled to a new
sentencing hearing before a jury. See Schriro, 542 U.S. at 350-51. "Watershed" rules of
criminal procedure generally have retroactive effect; merely procedural rules do not. See
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1990).
In rejecting the claim that the right to be sentenced to death by a jury, rather than a
judge, constituted a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure with full retroactive effect,
Justice Scalia noted that "the mixed reception that the right to jury trial has been given in
other countries, though irrelevant to the meaning and continued existence of that right
under our Constitution, surely makes it implausible that judicial factfinding so 'seriously
diminishe[s]' accuracy as to produce an 'impermissibly large risk' of injustice." Schriro, 542
U.S. at 356 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). This use of comparative law to establish
the nonfundamental nature of an asserted right harkens back to Palko and Twining, which
engaged in the exact same gambit. The problem, of course, is that the use of comparative law
must be a two-way street: if it is relevant to rejecting a constitutional claim, then it must also
be relevant to recognizing a constitutional claim. Justice Scalia, however, seems intent on
using foreign law only to reject, but not validate, recognition of human rights.
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Justice Scalia warned that "where there is not first a settled
consensus among our own people, the views of other nations,
however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to
be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.'212
Thus, under Justice Scalia's approach, the views of other nations
can be relevant in rejecting substantive due process claims,
notwithstanding the apparent imprimatur of domestic tradition,
but cannot be used to determine whether a practice is "cruel or
unusual" for Eighth Amendment purposes. One has to wonder,
however, why recourse to foreign law should be limited to rejecting
claims that enjoy the backing of tradition, as mere "accidents," but
not used to vindicate or establish such claims in the first place. In
other words, foreign law should be relevant to defining tradition or
it should not; if it is not relevant, then it should play no part in the
Supreme Court's decisional process. On the other hand, if it is
relevant, then the Supreme Court needs to provide guidance on
precisely when it becomes relevant and how it should be established
by the parties.213
E. Dispensing with the Tradition Requirement Entirely
Despite the Glucksberg Court's insistence that "[w]e begin, as we
do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal
traditions, and practices, 214 the Supreme Court has not always
212. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213. See David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV.
539, 556-66 (2001) (sketching a methodological and theoretical framework for the routine use
of foreign legal materials in domestic litigation before the federal courts); Melissa A. Waters,
Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and
Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 490-92, 556-67 (2005) (setting forth reasons
federal courts should participate in transnational judicial dialogue and suggesting limits on
when such participation should occur); cf. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 'Td Like To Teach the
World To Sing (In Perfect Harmony)" International Judicial Dialogue and the
Muses-Reflections on the Perils and the Promise of International Judicial Dialogue, 104
MICH. L. REv. 1321, 1322-25, 1335-36, 1356-58 (2006) (reviewing JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY
DEMOCRACY: AN INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION (Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer eds.,
2004)) (suggesting that practical difficulties associated with operationalizing transnational
borrowing, including the lack of appreciation of socio-legal culture or the particular
institutional constraints facing a foreign constitutional court, make such efforts difficult, if
not impossible for most U.S. federal judges).
214. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,710,721 (1997) ("Our Nation's history, legal
traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial 'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking'
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limited the recognition of unenumerated rights via the doctrine of
substantive due process to interests deeply rooted in the U.S. legal
or social tradition."' Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically rejected
the more open-ended approach embraced by Justice Souter, which
was largely based on Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissenting
opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 6 explaining that "[t]his approach tends
to rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in
due process judicial review. 21 7 Similarly, in County of Sacramento
v. Lewis, the Supreme Court explained that "Glucksberg presented
a disagreement about the significance of historical examples of
protected liberty in determining whether a given statute could be
judged to contravene the Fourteenth Amendment.""' Lewis in-
volved a fatal injury to a passenger on a motorcycle being pursued
by a Sacramento County, California, sheriffs deputy.2 9 The district
court dismissed a § 1983 suit brought against the deputy and the
sheriffs department based on qualified immunity; the Ninth
Circuit, however, reversed, holding that the officer and department
could have acted with "deliberate indifference" and that this
standard of care was known, or should have been known, to law
enforcement personnel at the time of the events in question.2 °
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, rejected the Ninth
Circuit's deliberate indifference standard in favor of a rule requir-
ing a plaintiff to show intentional harm:221 "Just as a purpose to
cause harm is needed for Eighth Amendment liability in a [prison]
riot case, so it ought to be needed for due process liability in a
pursuit case. 22 Along the way, Justice Souter identified the
"shocks the conscience" test as the standard for assessing the
deputy's conduct.2" His application of the test, however, placed no
real weight on history or tradition. Justice Souter explained that,
in a case "challenging executive action on substantive due process
that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause." (citation omitted)).
215. Id. at 721 (citation omitted).
216. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
217. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
218. 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998).
219. Id. at 836-37.
220. Id. at 837-38.
221. See id. at 852-54.
222. Id. at 854.
223. Id. at 846.
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grounds, like this one, ... an issue antecedent to any question about
the need for historical examples of enforcing a liberty interest of the
sort claimed" must be addressed.224 In such cases, "the threshold
question is whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so
egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the
contemporary conscience., 2" Glucksberg, however, seemed to hold
that only tradition-based claims were protected under substantive
due process. Souter explained that "the difference of opinion in
Glucksberg was about the need for historical examples of recogni-
tion of the claimed liberty protection at some appropriate level of
specificity" and, by way of contrast, "[i]n an executive action case,
no such issue can arise if the conduct does not reach the degree of
the egregious." '226 The Lewis Court appeared to say that the "shocks
the-conscience" test serves as a prerequisite to reaching the
tradition inquiry; if a plaintiff fails to show that the executive
action at issue "shocks-the-conscience," a court need not reach
questions related to tradition at all.227
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice
O'Connor, expressly disavowed any absolute obligation to limit the
scope of substantive due process to rights that could pass a
tradition test: "[Ilt must be added that history and tradition are the
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substan-
tive due process inquiry."22 Moreover, "[lt can no longer be
controverted that due process has a substantive component as well"
and, "[a]s a consequence, certain actions are prohibited no matter
what procedures attend them." '229 On the facts presented, however,
"[i]t suffices to conclude that neither our legal traditions nor the
present needs of law enforcement justify finding a due process
violation when unintended injuries occur after the police pursue a
suspect who disobeys their lawful order to stop."23
Justice Scalia expressed strong reservations about the majority's
use of the "shocks-the-conscience" test in lieu of a tradition based
224. Id. at 847 n.8.
225. Id. at 848 n.8.
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. Id. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 856.
230. Id. at 858.
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test: "The atavistic methodology that JUSTICE SOUTER announces for
the Court is the very same methodology that the Court called
atavistic when it was proffered by JUSTICE SOUTER in
Glucksberg."23' Indeed, Justice Scalia believed that the Lewis
formulation of the test was even broader than Justice Souter's
concurring opinion in Glucksberg: "Whereas the latter said merely
that substantive due process prevents 'arbitrary impositions' and
'purposeless restraints' (without any objective criterion as to what
is arbitrary or purposeless), today's opinion resuscitates the neplus
ultra, the Napoleon Brandy, the Mahatma Gandhi, the Cellophane
of subjectivity, th' ol' 'shocks-the-conscience' test."'232 Justice Scalia
continued, "[a]dhering to our decision in Glucksberg, rather than
ask whether the police conduct here at issue shocks my unelected
conscience, I would ask whether our Nation has traditionally
protected the right respondents assert." '233 Justice Scalia quickly
concluded that no such tradition of protection against injury from
an otherwise lawful attempt by a police officer to arrest a fleeing
suspect existed:234 "I would reverse the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit, not on the ground that petitioners have failed to shock my
still, soft voice within, but on the ground that respondents offer no
textual or historical support for their alleged due process right."'235
Justice Scalia's objection that Lewis failed to observe the
Glucksberg methodology was spot on. Lewis was a reversion to a
line of cases holding that any government action, if sufficiently
arbitrary or irrational, violates the Due Process Clause. The line
encompasses Lochner v. New York236 and extends to the modern
231. Id. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
232. Id. (with apologies to Cole Porter). Justice Scalia also rejected the majority's effort
to distinguish Glucksberg as having involved legislative, rather than executive, action. 'The
proposition that 'shocks-the-conscience' is a test applicable only to executive action is original
with today's opinion." Id. at 861 n.2. Justice Scalia correctly noted that this approach "has
never been suggested in any of our cases" and that the "shocks-the-conscience" test "was
recited in at least one opinion involving legislative action." Id. He concluded that he was
"happy to accept whatever limitations the Court today is willing to impose upon the 'shocks-
the-conscience' test, though it is a puzzlement why substantive due process protects some
liberties against executive officers but not against legislatures." Id.
233. Id. at 862.
234. See id. at 862-64.
235. Id. at 865.
236. See 198 U.S. 45, 57,62 (1905) ('There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the
liberty of person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the
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punitive damages cases.2 37 "As a general matter, the Court has
always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended,""2 8 and, in general, a
plaintiff seeking recognition of a substantive due process claim
must demonstrate that the claim enjoys some sort of historical
imprimatur." 9 But the Rehnquist Court consistently failed to
observe the tradition limitation as establishing the outer limits of
due process. The decisions considering the constitutional status of
punitive damages perhaps provide the most glaring departure from
the tradition rule.
Starting in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,2 40
decided in 1991, and continuing through 2003 with the decision in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,24 1 the
Supreme Court has imposed limits on punitive damages in the
absence of any "tradition" establishing such limits. As the Court
noted in Pacific Mutual, punitive damages have long been a feature
of the common law in the United States,2 42 and "[in view of this
consistent history, we cannot say that the common-law method for
assessing punitive damages [by jury with appellate court review] is
so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitu-
tional. 243 In theory, this should have been the end of the matter.
Indeed, Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, said as much:2
44
"Since jury-assessed punitive damages are a part of our living
occupation of a baker.... Adding to all these requirements, a prohibition to enter into any
contract of labor in a bakery for more than a certain number of hours a week, is, in our
judgment, so wholly beside the matter of a proper, reasonable, and fair provision, as to run
counter to that liberty of person and of free contract provided for in the Federal
Constitution.").
237. See infra notes 240-80, 292-304 and accompanying text.
238. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
239. See, e.g., id. at 126 ("Neither the text nor the history of the Due Process Clause
supports petitioner's claim that the governmental employer's duty to provide its employees
with a safe working environment is a substantive component of the Due Process Clause.").
240. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
241. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
242. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15.
243. Id. at 17.
244. See id. at 24-28, 39-40 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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tradition that dates back prior to 1868, I would end the suspense
and categorically affirm their validity.
2 45
Notwithstanding history's strong imprimatur, this was "not the
end of the matter. 246 Justice Blackmun explained that "[i]t would
be just as inappropriate to say that, because punitive damages have
been recognized for so long, their imposition is never unconstitu-
tional. 2 47 The majority declared that "our task today is to deter-
mine whether the Due Process Clause renders the punitive
damages award in this case constitutionally unacceptable," for
reasons having nothing to do with the history of punitive damages
in the United States.2 48 Fearing the ability of a jury to award
punitive damages that produce "extreme results that jar one's
constitutional sensibilities," the majority went on to hold that
punitive damages awards must be held to a standard of "reason-
ableness and adequate [jury] guidance. 2 49 In the case at bar, the
Alabama punitive damages award did not "jar" the majority's
"constitutional sensibilities," whatever those were, and, therefore,
did not transgress the outer limits of due process of law.25 °
Justice Scalia preferred a more absolute approach that would
take the Supreme Court out of the business of reviewing punitive
damages awards at all;2"' Justice Kennedy also wrote a concurring
opinion in which he expressed concern that the majority's approach
was insufficiently deferential to state legislatures and state
supreme courts:25 2 "Historical acceptance of legal institutions serves
to validate them not because history provides the most convenient
rule of decision but because we have confidence that a long-accepted
legal institution would not have survived if it rested upon proce-
dures found to be either irrational or unfair. 2s 3 Thus, he concluded
that the "judgment of history should govern the outcome in the
case before [the Court]" because "[j]ury determination of punitive
damages has such long and principled recognition as a central part
245. Id. at 39-40.
246. Id. at 18 (majority opinion).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 19-24.
251. Id. at 39-40 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
252. Id. at 42 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
253. Id. at 40.
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of our system that no further evidence of its essential fairness or
rationality ought to be deemed necessary." '254 Justice Kennedy
suggested that, absent a "verdict returned by a biased or prejudiced
jury," there was no justification for a federal court to undertake "a
detailed examination" of the merits of the punitive damages
award.255 He emphasized that "[w]e do not have the authority, as do
judges in some of the States, to alter the rules of the common law
respecting the proper standard for awarding punitive damages and
the respective roles of the jury and the court in making that
determination. 25 6
Justice O'Connor dissented from the decision to affirm the
Alabama punitive damages award because the jury instructions
associated with punitive damage awards were "so fraught with
uncertainty that they defy rational implementation."25 7 "While I do
not question the general legitimacy of punitive damages," she
wrote, "I see a strong need to provide juries with standards to
constrain their discretion so that they may exercise their power
wisely, not capriciously or maliciously. '258 More specifically, Justice
O'Connor believed that "[d]ue process requires that a State provide
meaningful standards to guide the application of its laws" and that
"Alabama's common-law scheme for imposing punitive damages is
void for vagueness."259 Justice O'Connor flatly rejected the idea that
the long history of unbridled jury discretion to impose punitive
damages established a strong presumption in favor of the practice,
because "[d]ue process is not a fixed notion. '260 In her view, recent
changes in jury behavior justified a more hands-on judicial ap-
proach to regulating such awards at the constitutional level.261
Alabama's approach, in particular, gave "free reign to the biases
254. Id.
255. Id. at 41-42.
256. Id. at 42. This was a rather ironic statement, viewed against Justice Kennedy's
subsequent majority opinion in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. V. Campbell,
which appeared to do exactly what Justice Kennedy decried: "alter the rules of the common
law respecting the proper standard for awarding punitive damages." See 538 U.S. 408, 416
(2003).
257. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 44.
260. Id. at 60-61.
261. See id. at 61-63.
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and prejudices of individual jurors, allowing them to target un-
popular defendants and punish selectively."262 In her view, due
process precluded "arbitrary" government action and the Alabama
system was "the antithesis of due process."2 3
Two years later, in TXO Production Corporation v. Alliance
Resources Corp., the Supreme Court once again considered impos-
ing limits on punitive damages as a function of substantive due
process.264 Justice Stevens, announcing the judgment of the Court,
identified the applicable standard as whether a particular award is
"grossly excessive. ' Although acknowledging that the earliest
cases establishing this rule arose during the Lochner era, the
plurality reaffirmed the Haslip ruling that due process imposes
limits on the award of punitive damages.266 The Court ultimately
reiterated and applied the Haslip "reasonableness" standard to
determine whether the award at issue was "grossly excessive" and
concluded that it was not.267
Once again, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, this time
joined by Justice Thomas, but expressly rejected the idea that
federal courts should review state court jury punitive damages
awards for "reasonableness":
I am willing to accept the proposition that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, despite its textual
limitation to procedure, incorporates certain substantive
guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights; but I do not accept the
proposition that it is the secret repository of all sorts of other,
unenumerated, substantive rights-however fashionable that
proposition may have been (even as to economic rights of the
sort involved here) at the time of the Lochner-era cases the
plurality relies upon.2"'
262. Id. at 63.
263. Id.
264. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1993) (plurality
opinion).
265. Id. at 454.
266. Id. at 455, 458.
267. See id. at 458 (noting that "[i]n the end, then, in determining whether a particular
award is so 'grossly excessive' as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, we return to what we said two Terms ago in Haslip" and applying a standard
of "reasonableness" to the West Virginia jury award at issue in the case).
268. Id. at 470-71 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Justice Kennedy repeated his view that "[w]hen a punitive
damages award reflects bias, passion, or prejudice on the part of the
jury, rather than a rational concern for deterrence and retribution,
the Constitution has been violated, no matter what the absolute or
relative size of the award." '269 In the case at bar, Justice Kennedy
did not find sufficient evidence of irrationality or prejudice to justify
invalidating the jury's award of punitive damages.27 °
Justice O'Connor, who believed the award reflected strong bias
against an out-of-state corporation, argued that it violated due
process: "Influences such as caprice, passion, bias, and prejudice are
antithetical to the rule of law."27' If a punitive damages award
transgresses these notions of "fundamental fairness," then it should
be invalidated on due process grounds.27 2 "Given the absence of
another plausible explanation for this monumentally large punitive
damages award," Justice O'Connor "believe[d] it likely, if not
inescapable, that the jury was influenced unduly by TXO's out-of-
state status and its large resources." '273
Ultimately, TXO expanded the scope of review first articulated
in Haslip, but once again concluded that the award did not violate
the requirements of substantive due process. Three years later, in
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Supreme Court finally
invalidated a punitive damages award on due process grounds.274
The Gore opinion opened with a matter of fact statement of the
due process rights of defendants in civil lawsuits: 'The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from
imposing a 'grossly excessive' punishment on a tortfeasor. '275
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, cited TXO for this
proposition and completed his due process analysis in a single
opening paragraph; the bulk of the opinion applied the "grossly
269. Id. at 467 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
270. Id. at 468.
271. Id. at 475-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("If there is a fixture of due process, it is that
a verdict based on such influences cannot stand.").
272. See id. at 476-81.
273. Id. at 495.
274. 517 U.S. 559, 562-63, 568-86 (1996).
275. Id. at 562 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 454); see also id. at 568 ("Only when an award
can fairly be categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to these interests [punishing and
deterring unlawful conduct] does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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excessive" standard and found that an award of $4 million for a
refinished paint job on a BMW vehicle sold as new, with a maxi-
mum compensatory value of $4000, met this standard.27
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, authored
a concurring opinion that emphasized the protection against
arbitrary government action that underlay the Supreme Court's
punitive damages jurisprudence: "Requiring the application of
law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice, does more than
simply provide citizens notice of what actions may subject them to
punishment; it also helps to assure the uniform general treatment
of similarly situated persons that is the essence of law itself."2 He
continued, stating that "[1]egal standards need not be precise to
satisfy this constitutional concern. But they must offer some kind
of constraint upon a jury or court's discretion, and thus protection
against purely arbitrary behavior." '278
All of this is well and good. After all, who advocates arbitrary,
lawless government action or opposes values associated with the
rule of law? The problem, of course, is the lack of a tradition of
limiting jury discretion when assessing punitive damages; if the
rule of law requires such limits, evidently the nation suffered-for
more than 200 years!-under the delusion that it operated under
the rule of law. Justice Breyer asked, rhetorically:
To the extent that neither clear legal principles nor fairly
obvious historical or community based standards (defining, say,
especially egregious behavior) significantly constrain punitive
damages awards, is there not a substantial risk of outcomes so
arbitrary that they become difficult to square with the Constitu-
tion's assurance, to every citizen, of the law's protection?" 9
276. See id. at 562-63, 568-86.
277. Id. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring).
278. Id. at 588 (citation omitted).
279. Id. at 596.
980 [Vol. 48:923
DUMBO'S FEATHER
Coming from a bench that permits wide disparities in charging and
conviction rates for capital crimes,280 this plea for understanding
seems unpersuasive.
Many legal standards, as a matter of historical practice, vest
great discretion with decision makers. If "tradition" truly sets the
metes and bounds of substantive due process protection, then the
level of indeterminacy associated with punitive damage awards
should be unremarkable, as far as due process values are con-
cerned, precisely because "we've always done it this way." To the
extent that states decide to modify the rules governing punitive
damages, a new or modified tradition might arise-but none of
the Gore majority argued that such a consensus had come into
existence.
On these facts, the majority jumped the due process gun by
recognizing a due process right to be free of "grossly excessive"
punitive damage judgments. As states experiment with tort reform,
a plausible argument that an emerging trend has solidified into a
full blown tradition might arise. In 1996, however, this was not yet
the case-just as, at least arguably, the pace of law reform as of
1986 did not make Bowers an easy case, if viewed from the perspec-
tive of an emerging national consensus against sodomy laws.
One could argue that the requirement that all government action
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest, known as
the rationality requirement, rather than the fundamental rights
aspect of substantive due process, should have governed this case.
It is difficult to see, however, why the award in Gore was irrational:
it certainly advanced Alabama's interests in deterrence and
punishment in a direct, linear fashion. Justice Breyer concluded
that "the award in this unusual case violates the basic guarantee of
nonarbitrary governmental behavior that the Due Process Clause
provides.'2 '
280. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for Neutral Principles in
Constitutional Law: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging Jurisprudence of Oprah!, 90 GEO. L.J.
2087, 2124-29 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court's tolerance of vast disparities in death
penalty charges and convictions between and within states and questioning the consistency
of the Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), holding with McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987));
see also McClesky, 481 U.S. at 297 (rejecting statistical evidence showing that irrelevant
factors, such as race and financial status, seriously affect death penalty charges and
convictions in Georgia).
281. Gore, 517 U.S. at 597 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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One can identify the problem with this reasoning with relative
ease: it is far from obvious that the award in the case was, in fact,
utterly irrational and arbitrary. Certainly, if the mean level of
irrationality at work in Gore was sufficient to justify the federal-
ization of state tort law, as an incident of substantive due process,
then one could claim with equal passion, as Justice Blackmun
did, that laws proscribing consensual sodomy between adults, in
private, represent an unacceptable level of irrationality.282
The point here is fairly simple: either tradition counts, or it does
not. The Haslip line of cases demonstrates quite conclusively that
Chief Justice Rehnquist's efforts to cabin substantive due process
to rights enjoying the broad and long support of tradition have
failed. As things stand now, if a government decision is sufficiently
"shocking" to a majority of the Justices, they will not shy away from
deploying substantive due process to void the decision.2 ' Moreover,
it would be an odd human rights jurisprudence that elevates a
corporation's interest in avoiding money damages above an individ-
ual's interest in personal autonomy in her bedroom.
Before moving on, one should note that Justices Scalia and
Thomas remain committed to validating the states' discretion to
impose unlimited punitive damages. In Gore, Justice Scalia once
again noted that "I do not regard the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause as a secret repository of substantive guarantees
against 'unfairness'-neither the unfairness of an excessive civil
compensatory award, nor the unfairness of an 'unreasonable'
punitive award."2 Moreover, Justice Scalia recognized the gross
incursion on federalism that the Haslip line of cases represents:
The Constitution provides no warrant for federalizing yet
another aspect of our Nation's legal culture (no matter how
much in need of correction it may be), and the application of the
Court's new rule of constitutional law is constrained by no
principle other than the Justices' subjective assessment of the
"reasonableness" of the award in relation to the conduct for
which it was assessed.285
282. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 208-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled
by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
283. See supra notes 218-81 and accompanying text.
284. Gore, 517 U.S. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 599.
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Justice Ginsburg also dissented, warning that the majority had
established a virtually meaningless test:286 "It has only a vague
concept of substantive due process, a 'raised eyebrow' test as its
ultimate guide."2 7 She asked, "[wihat is the Court's measure of too
big?" and concluded that "[t]oo big is, in the end, the amount at
which five Members of the Court bridle."288 To prove her point that
no judicially discernable standard could yet be fixed for limiting
punitive damages, Justice Ginsburg attached an appendix listing
state tort reform efforts.289 As one would expect, these efforts do not
reflect any consistent pattern or practice. Finally, she warned that
"[iun contrast to habeas corpus review ... the Court will work at this
business alone."29 Indeed, as Justice Ginsburg correctly noted, the
federal Supreme Court "will be the only federal court policing the
area."
291
The Supreme Court's most recent effort at constitutionally-
mandated tort reform, State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, added remarkably little to the picture of an emerging "I
know it when I see it ' 292 punitive damages jurisprudence. 293 Once
a skeptic, Justice Kennedy wrote for the six-Justice majority that
invalidated a Utah punitive damages award. 94 Justice Kennedy
noted that "[wihile States possess discretion over the imposition of
punitive damages, it is well established that there are procedural
and substantive constitutional limitations on these awards. 295
And, repeating the chorus of the Supreme Court's earlier decisions
in the area, he explained that "[t]he Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly
286. Id. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Tellingly, the Court repeats that it brings to the
task no 'mathematical formula,' no 'categorical approach,' [and] no 'bright line."' (citations
omitted)).
287. Id. (citation omitted).
288. Id. at 613 n.5.
289. Id. at 614-19 app.; see also id. at 607 ("The Court, I am convinced, unnecessarily and
unwisely ventures into territory traditionally within the States' domain, and does so in the
face of reform measures recently adopted or currently under consideration in legislative
arenas.").
290. Id. at 613.
291. Id.
292. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
293. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
294. Id. at 418.
295. Id. at 416.
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excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor. ' 96 Campbell
limited the evidence that serves as the basis for a punitive damages
award to wrongdoing that occurred within the jurisdiction making
the award.97 and barred jury consideration of defendant wrongdoing
that bears "no relation" to the plaintiffs harm.298
Breaking with its earlier cases, the majority finally established
a mathematical baseline for assessing the validity of punitive
damages awards: "Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now
established demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." '299 This
is a truly remarkable act of judicial activism; in a single sentence,
Justice Kennedy preempted the tort reform debates that have been
ongoing in the various state legislatures and courts by imposing, as
a matter of federal constitutional law, a factor of 9 to 1 as the
presumptive limit on punitive damages."' 0 Justice Kennedy made
no effort to ground his ruling in Anglo-American common law;
instead, he simply observed that past cases permitted factors of
around 4 to 1 and noted that these past ratios "demonstrate what
should be obvious: Single-digit multipliers are more likely to
comport with due process, while still achieving the State's goals of
deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in range of 500
to 1, or, in this case, of 145 to 1.,,301
Although the 9 to 1 ratio provides a general rule of thumb,
"because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages
award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previ-
ously upheld may comport with due process where 'a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic
296. Id.
297. See id. at 420-21 ("Nor, as a general rule, does a State have a legitimate concern in
imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the
State's jurisdiction.").
298. Id. at 422-23 ("Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive
damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant
under the guise of reprehensibility analysis, but we have no doubt the Utah Supreme Court
did that here.").
299. Id. at 425.
300. See id.
301. Id. (citation omitted).
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damages."'3 °2 But, Justice Kennedy noted, "[t]he converse is also
true"; °3 thus, "[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial, then
a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can
reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.3 0 4
Lochner's decision to disallow daily and weekly maximum
working hours for bakers was less intrusive of state regulatory
authority than the Campbell metric for limiting punitive
damages.30 5 And, one should be careful to note that the Court made
no effort whatsoever to ground its math in the traditions and
practices of the American people, whether at the present or as a
matter of historical record. In other words, Campbell represents
federally imposed tort reform, on a national scale, in the name of
due process.0 6
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg all dissented-as they had
in Gore.3 °v Justice Scalia noted that he was "of the view that the
punitive damages jurisprudence which has sprung forth from BMW
v. Gore is insusceptible of principled application" and, accordingly,
he declined to give it "stare decisis effect. 308 Justice Thomas noted
that he "continue[d] to believe that the Constitution does not
constrain the size of punitive damages awards."0 9 Justice Ginsburg
emphasized that tort reform was a matter committed to state
governments and "remain[ed] of the view that this Court has no
302. Id.
303. See id.
304. Id.
305. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52-64 (1905).
306. Campbell is objectionable too with respect to the particular branch of the federal
government that displaced state policy-making authority over punitive damages; if the
federal government is to force "laggard" states to abandon unduly generous jury awards for
punitive damages, arguably Congress and not the Supreme Court should preempt state law,
via a legislative exercise of its Commerce Clause powers. See Althouse, supra note 58, at
1823-25 (suggesting that Congress should consider forcing 'laggard" states to respect a
national consensus position, but warning that "if one thinks there is a vanguard direction
and that it is good to take it, but also thinks that no one in power will reliably find it, one
ought to want decisions to be made at the lowest level-without 'risk to the rest of the
country,' as Justice Brandeis put it" (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
307. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); id.
at 430 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
309. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
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warrant to reform state law governing awards of punitive dam-
ages."31 She noted:
In a legislative scheme or a state high court's design to cap
punitive damages, the handiwork in setting single-digit and 1-
to- 1 benchmarks could hardly be questioned; in a judicial decree
imposed on the States by this Court under the banner of
substantive due process, the numerical controls today's decision
installs seem to me boldly out of order. 1
The use of abstract, and perhaps highly personal, notions of
justice to disallow state punitive damages awards rests very
uncomfortably against the Supreme Court's general reluctance to
recognize fundamental rights involving decisions such as the time
at which one will die312 and the rights of nontraditional biological
fathers.313 Frankly, a more consistent reliance on tradition might
have led to a better outcome in the Haslip line of cases: if, as
Justice O'Connor has argued, juries had become more likely to
grant outrageous punitive damage awards,314 it would have been
more tradition-friendly-and also federalism-friendly-for the
Court simply to note the possible conflict with notions of equal
protection or substantive due process, and then wait to see what, if
any, action the states took. Certainly, such an approach would have
better served values associated with judicial minimalism315 than
adoption and enforcement of an overt "raised eyebrow" standard.316
310. Id. at 430-31, 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 438.
312. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-12, 719-36 (1997).
313. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-30 (1989) (plurality opinion).
314. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "[a]s little as 30 years ago, punitive damages awards were 'rarely
assessed' and usually 'small in amount," but that "[r]ecently ... the frequency and size of such
awards have been skyrocketing" (quoting Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the
Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982))); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 61-63 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Recent years, however, have witnessed
an explosion in the frequency and size of punitive damages awards.").
315. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 3-6, 161-62 (1999) (explaining the benefits of decisional minimalism); Cass R.
Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 6-10 (1996) (explaining when minimalism should be used by the Supreme Court
and why).
316. See TXO, 499 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("This $10 million punitive award,
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III. STATE COUNTING, OR CONSENSUS, AS A MEANS OF DEFINING
TRADITION
This Part systematically considers the phenomenon of state
counting as a means of establishing and constitutionalizing a
national consensus. In the context of Eighth Amendment cases, the
contemporary Supreme Court has enshrined state counting as its
preferred means of defining "cruel and unusual" punishments.317
Even though bitter disagreements exist among the Justices
regarding the proper methodology for state counting in these cases,
unanimity exists regarding the general approach, at least in this
context.31 Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is, of course, effec-
tively a subset of substantive due process because the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is technically the source of
the limitation on criminal punishments. However, more generic
substantive due process cases also feature state counting as a
methodology.319 These cases merit careful consideration when
evaluating the overall promise of this approach to defining tradi-
tion.
In both the Eighth Amendment and more generic substantive due
process contexts, the cases reflect a grossly undertheorized
approach to the state counting methodology; the Justices appear to
be approaching state counting on an entirely ad hoc basis.32 ° If state
counting is to serve as a credible means of ascertaining the
"traditions from which [this nation] broke," '321 a more systematic
approach to state counting will be required.
returned in a case involving only $19,000 in compensatory damages, is a dramatically
irregular, if not shocking, verdict by any measure. At the very least it should raise a
suspicious judicial eyebrow." (emphasis added)).
317. See infra Part III.A.
318. See id.
319. See infra Part III.B.
320. See Jacobi, supra note 129, at 1147.
321. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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A. State Counting in the Specific Context of the Eighth
Amendment
The Supreme Court has relied on state counting most promi-
nently in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, when deciding
whether a particular punishment is "cruel and unusual." For
example, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court counted states to deter-
mine whether it remained constitutional to execute mentally
retarded persons.322 It adopted the same approach in Roper v.
Simmons to decide whether the Constitution permitted execution
of minors.323 In deciding whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual, the Court will engage in a "proportionality review" and
apply the "evolving standards of decency" to test the proportionality
of a proposed criminal sanction. 4 Justice Stevens, writing for the
Atkins majority, explained that "[p]roportionality review under
those evolving standards should be informed by 'objective factors to
the maximum possible extent."' 325 The best source of such objective
evidence is "legislation enacted by the country's legislatures. 326
Accordingly, the majority viewed its task as reviewing "the
judgment of legislatures that have addressed the suitability of
imposing the death penalty on the mentally retarded and then con-
sider reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with their judgment. 327
The Atkins Court found that, from 1989 to 2001, eighteen states
enacted legislation prohibiting the execution of the mentally
retarded, and in three other states some portion of the legislature
adopted such legislation but the bill failed to become law.328 In the
same twelve-year period, no state adopted a law expressly providing
for the execution of the mentally retarded. As Justice Stevens
wrote, "[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is
322. 536 U.S. 304, 313-16 (2002).
323. 543 U.S. 551, 564-67 (2005).
324. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) ("The basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.... The Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.").
325. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
326. Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
327. Id. at 313.
328. See id. at 314-15.
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significant, but the consistency of the direction of change. 329 He
argued that "the large number of States prohibiting the execution
of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States
passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such execu-
tions) provides powerful evidence that today our society views
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the
average criminal."33 Justice Stevens also addressed the relative
infrequency with which states permitting the execution of mentally
retarded persons actually do so: "even in those States that allow the
execution of mentally retarded offenders, the practice is uncom-
mon." '331 In sum, "[t]he practice ... therefore, has become truly
unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has devel-
oped against it." '332
Precisely how does the majority define "national consensus"? In
Atkins, it appears to be a function of a thirty to twenty split among
the states regarding the execution of the mentally retarded. If the
eighteen states prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded
are added to the twelve states that do not impose capital punish-
ment at all, state counting yields a split of thirty states opposed to
executing mentally retarded persons to twenty states in favor of the
practice.333
Justice Scalia considered this to be fuzzy math. He objected that
the majority "miraculously extracts a 'national consensus' forbid-
ding execution of the mentally retarded from the fact that 18
States-less than half (47%) of the 38 States that permit capital
punishment (for whom the issue exists)-have very recently
enacted legislation barring execution of the mentally retarded." '334
Indeed, in Scalia's view, the "bare number of States alone
-18-should be enough to convince any reasonable person that no
'national consensus' exists." '335 He asked: "How is it possible that
agreement among 47% of the death penalty jurisdictions amounts
to 'consensus'?"3 6 Of course, Justice Stevens had an easy answer:
329. Id. at 315.
330. Id. at 315-16.
331. Id. at 316.
332. Id.
333. See id. at 313-15.
334. Id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
335. Id. at 343.
336. Id.
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the correct percentage is sixty percent of the states, rather than
forty-seven percent of death penalty jurisdictions. One should
aggregate the twelve states without a death penalty with the
eighteen states that generally prohibit the execution of mentally
retarded persons; thirty of fifty states yields a sixty percent, not a
forty-seven percent, figure. At least arguably, sixty percent
constitutes a "consensus."
The Supreme Court utilized state counting in another Eighth
Amendment case, Stanford v. Kentucky.337 In that case, the majority
concluded that a fifteen-state plurality of the thirty-seven states
then imposing the death penalty did not establish a national
consensus against executing persons sixteen years of age, and that
a twelve-state plurality against executing persons seventeen years
of age also failed to establish a consensus against the practice.33
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia declared that "[t]his does
not establish the degree of national consensus this Court has
previously thought sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel
and unusual." '339 Morever, the majority refused to consider the "14
States that do not authorize capital punishment"'34 in the calcula-
tion:
It seems to us ... that while the number of those jurisdictions
bears upon the question whether there is a consensus against
capital punishment altogether, it is quite irrelevant to the
specific inquiry in this case: whether there is a settled consensus
in favor of punishing offenders under 18 differently from those
over 18 insofar as capital punishment is concerned.3 41
Justice Brennan, in dissent, aggregated states with no death
penalty with those that exclude minors from its application.342
Using this approach, he concluded that "the governments in fully 27
of the States have concluded that no one under 18 should face the
death penalty" and noted that "[a] further three States explicitly
337. 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005).
338. Id. at 370-71 ("Of the 37 States whose laws permit capital punishment, 15 decline to
impose it upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to impose it on 17-year-old offenders.").
339. Id.
340. Id. at 370 n.2.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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refuse to authorize sentences of death for those who committed
their offense when under 17, making a total of 30 States that would
not tolerate the execution of petitioner Wilkins." 43
Thus, in Stanford, divisions of twenty-seven to twenty-three and
thirty to twenty were insufficient evidence to establish a national
consensus against the execution of minors. Justice O'Connor, who
provided the crucial fifth vote in Stanford, authored a concurring
opinion in which she noted that "[t]he day may come when there is
such general legislative rejection of the execution of 16- or 17-year-
old capital murderers that a clear national consensus can be said to
have developed."344
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, a 5-3 majority of the Supreme Court
found that, because all eighteen states specifying a minimum age
for the imposition of the death penalty select sixteen years of age or
older, Oklahoma could not constitutionally execute an offender who
was fifteen years old at the time of his crime.34 Lest there be any
doubt about the importance of this unanimity, Justice O'Connor, in
a concurring opinion, emphasized that "[t]he most salient statistic
that bears on this case is that every single American legislature
that has expressly set a minimum age for capital punishment has
set that age at sixteen or above."34 Justice O'Connor also aggre-
gated the 14 states, including the District of Columbia, "that have
rejected capital punishment completely" to find "that almost two-
thirds of the state legislatures have definitely concluded that no 15-
year-old should be exposed to the threat of execution. 347 Justice
O'Connor argued that,
[w]here such a large majority [thirty-one of fifty] of the state
legislatures have unambiguously outlawed capital punishment
for 15-year-olds, and where no legislature in this country has
affirmatively and unequivocally endorsed such a practice, strong
343. Id. (citation omitted).
344. Id. at 381-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
345. 487 U.S. 815, 829 (1988) ("When we confine our attention to the 18 States that have
expressly established a minimum age in their death penalty statutes, we find that all of them
require that the defendant have attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the capital
offense.').
346. Id. at 849 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
347. Id.
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counterevidence would be required to persuade me that a
national consensus against this practice does not exist.3 41
Accordingly, Justice O'Connor concluded that Oklahoma must
establish an express policy of executing persons fifteen years of
age-it could not rely on a general death penalty statute that
contained no minimum age to accomplish this outcome.3 49 Justice
O'Connor also voted with the majority in Atkins, which featured
virtually the same statistical breakdown-an eighteen to nineteen
split among death penalty states against executing mentally
retarded persons and an overall thirty-one to nineteen split if one
adds the states without a death penalty to those exempting
mentally retarded defendants.3 °
Justice Scalia displayed the same consistency and, as in Atkins,
preferred to focus on the nineteen to eighteen split among death
penalty states that set a minimum age for a death sentence:
It is beyond me why an accurate analysis would not include
within the computation the larger number of States (19) that
have determined that no minimum age for capital punishment
is appropriate, leaving that to be governed by their general rules
for the age at which juveniles can be criminally responsible.3 5'
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Roper v. Simmons,352
methodologically a reprise of Atkins, did not break any new ground
in state counting. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy found
that a thirty to twenty division of the states on the question of
348. Id.
349. See id. at 857-58 ("Were it clear that no national consensus forbids the imposition of
capital punishment for crimes committed before the age of 16, the implicit nature of the
Oklahoma Legislature's decision would not be constitutionally problematic. In the peculiar
circumstances we face today, however, the Oklahoma statutes have presented this Court
with a result that is of very dubious constitutionality, and they have done so without the
earmarks of careful consideration that we have required for other kinds of decisions leading
to the death penalty. In this unique situation, I am prepared to conclude that petitioner and
others who were below the age of 16 at the time of their offense may not be executed under
the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at which the
commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execution.").
350. Or, a thirty-two to nineteen split if one were to count the District of Columbia as a
state. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002).
351. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 867-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
352. 543 U.S. 551, 564-65 (2005).
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executing offenders younger than eighteen, coupled with a slight
law reform movement in favor of abolishing capital punishment for
minors, established a national consensus against the practice.353
This conclusion was bolstered by the rejection of the juvenile
death penalty, at least officially, in all other nations.5 4 As in
Atkins, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas, objected to the majority's math and invocation of
foreign legal precedents in support of the abolition of the juvenile
death penalty."55
The Eighth Amendment cases suggest that a bare majority of
states is not enough to establish the consensus necessary to show
that a punishment is "unusual" for Eighth Amendment purposes.
They also suggest that some number above thirty states comes close
to the line for establishing that a punishment is unusual, particu-
larly if the remaining twenty states impose the punishment
infrequently and the other democracies have rejected the practice.3 5
353. See id. (aggregating both states without any death penalty (twelve) and states that
prohibit the execution of minors (eighteen)).
354. See id. at 575-77.
355. See id. at 608-15, 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
356. In all four Eighth Amendment cases, Justices supporting the proposition that the
punishment was cruel and unusual cited the practices of foreign nations. See id. at 575
(majority opinion) ("Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty."); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316-17 & n.20 (2002) (citing opposition of
the "world community" to the execution of mentally retarded persons); Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 389-90 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that "[m]any countries ... have
formally abolished the death penalty," that "a majority" of nations that retain the death
penalty expressly "prohibit the execution of juveniles," and concluding that "[w]ithin the
world community, the imposition of the death penalty for juvenile crimes appears to be
overwhelmingly disapproved"), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005);
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830 ("The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of
decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense
is consistent with the views that have been expressed by respected professional
organizations, by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading
members of the Western European community."). In these four cases, members of the Court
who were opposed to that conclusion rejected such evidence as entirely irrelevant. See Roper,
543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("More fundamentally, however, the basic premise of
the Court's argument-that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world--ought to be rejected out of hand.'); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("I fail to see, however, how the views of other countries regarding the
punishment of their citizens provide any support for the Court's ultimate determination.");
id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Equally irrelevant are the practices of the 'world
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B. State Counting in General Substantive Due Process Cases
In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the trend
in law reform favored abolition of antisodomy laws; only nine
states prohibited sodomy generally and only four states prohibited
same-sex sodomy specifically.35 v Although this was only one reason
offered in support of the majority's conclusion that a national
consensus existed against antisodomy laws, it was an important
component of Justice Kennedy's argument.3 s8 State counting
appeared in substantive due process cases before Lawrence.
In Loving v. Virginia, Chief Justice Warren noted that "Virginia
is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on the
basis of racial classifications." 359 He also observed that "[o]ver the
past 15 years, 14 States have repealed laws outlawing interracial
marriages. 36 ° In 1952, thirty states prohibited interracial mar-
riages, whereas only eighteen states permitted them; during the
next fifteen years, fourteen states repealed their proscriptions
against such unions, leaving the split at thirty-four to sixteen in
1967.361 Although Loving's substantive due process holding did not
directly reference the trend of law reform regarding interracial
362marriage, it undoubtedly played some role in the majority's
thinking. In declaring that "[t]he freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,"363 the fact that thirty-
community,' whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.");
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.1 ("We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that
are dispositive, rejecting the contention ... that the sentencing practices of other countries
are relevant."); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("ee must never forget
that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are expounding. The
practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining
whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident .... But
where there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations,
however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed
upon Americans through the Constitution."). For a discussion of the use of foreign legal
authority to inform domestic legal traditions, see infra Part IV.C.2.
357. 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
358. See infra notes 417-28 and accompanying text.
359. 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967).
360. Id. at 6 n.5.
361. See id.
362. See id. at 11-12.
363. Id. at 12.
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four states would sanction the precise union at issue-and only
sixteen would not-was clearly an important factor supporting the
majority's conclusion.
More recently, the Bowers Court engaged in state counting:
Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbid-
den by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the
Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal
sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy,
and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to
provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and
between consenting adults.1 4
Based on these numbers-a twenty-four to twenty-six split among
the states-Justice White rejected as "facetious" the idea that
sodomy was deeply rooted in this nation's traditions.365
Professor William Eskridge has done a brilliant job of decons-
tructing Justice White's attempted history lesson.366 A careful
observer should hesitate to accept as conclusive Justice White's
numbers prior to 1961, because the statutes at issue did not
necessarily regulate the precise sexual practices at issue in
Bowers.367 Even Eskridge, however, concedes that the 1961 figure
is relevant: after 1961, the reform movement to repeal antisodomy
laws stalled and antigay animus was sufficiently pervasive that
many states enacted laws intentionally targeting homosexual
sexual practices for criminal proscription.368 As Eskridge notes, the
reform movement against such laws began in the 1950s and had
already achieved some successes by the 1960s. 369 The fact remains,
however, that twenty-four of fifty states maintained formal legal
prohibitions against sodomy, whether applicable to all forms of
364. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
365. Id. at 194.
366. See Eskridge, supra note 16, at 643-72.
367. See id. at 660-65.
368. Id. at 663-64; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the
Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-
1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 842-44 (1997).
369. Eskridge, supra note 16, at 661-65.
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sodomy or only same-sex sodomy."v' If state counting can establish
a new or emerging legal tradition, the picture in 1986 was less
compelling than the comparable data for interracial marriage in
1967 or the abolition of poll taxes in 1966."7l Of course, by 2003, the
numbers had shifted dramatically; a methodology yielding uncer-
tain results in 1986, provided a much more definitive answer in
2003.
Lawrence presents a very strong case for invalidation based on
state counting: from 1961 to the present, thirty-seven states
abandoned their laws proscribing sodomy, whether via legislative
reform or judicial invalidation.372 In 2003, only thirteen states
prohibited sodomy, and four of those states only prohibited same-
sex sodomy.8 73 This background of state law presents a much
stronger case than the Justices faced in 1986, when twenty-four
states and the District of Columbia still maintained laws
criminalizing sodomy.374 Put differently, between 1986 and 2004,
twelve more states abandoned efforts to proscribe sodomy, if
committed in private, between consenting adults, on a noncommer-
cial basis. During that same period, no state added a generally
applicable proscription against the practice or strengthened
proscriptions against the practice under existing law. Moreover, the
general background of almost total nonenforcement of existing
sodomy laws remained unchanged.
To be clear, the tradition analysis should probably not stop with
merely counting states that maintain formal rules in the lawbooks,
the approach Justice White adopted in Bowers. Laws in books are
not necessarily laws that the community intends to enforce. If
tradition refers to actual practices, rather than a code of legisla-
tively defined "best practices," the community's commitment to
enforcing a law should be relevant to ascertaining the law as a
source of tradition. Thus, some attention to whether the states
actually enforce these laws seems essential. 75
370. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94.
371. See supra notes 150-53, 359-61 and accompanying text.
372. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003).
373. See id.
374. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94.
375. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
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IV. AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OUTSIDE THE FOUR CORNERS OF
ARTICLE V
Substantive due process effectively represents a means ofjudicial
amendment to the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment. If a
practice seems sufficiently deeply rooted in the United States, and
it relates to a sufficiently weighty interest, judges will limit the
ability of legislators to burden or abrogate the practice. The
reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials has such a long and
storied history in Anglo-American law that New York was no longer
free to abandon the standard, even as part and parcel of a compre-
hensive reform of the juvenile criminal law system.376 Similarly, the
common law's treatment of unwanted medical treatment as a
battery establishes a rule that cannot be abolished or amended
casually; the government would have to assert a pressing concern
to succeed in stripping or limiting a citizen of this right.377
For practices like the reasonable doubt standard in criminal
trials and the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, the
rationale for disallowing government tinkering is self-evident: these
rules are simply part of our legal and cultural backdrop; we assume
these rules because we have always had them. Accordingly, cases
like In re Winship and Cruzan do not present hard questions.
As one moves away from rights and interests that have deep
roots in the common law, however, the water becomes a bit
murkier. Short of an unbroken two-hundred-plus year history of
observance, what conditions should exist before a judge, or group of
judges, prohibit or limit legislative tinkering? How might we
understand tradition in more dynamic terms without abandoning
principled judicial decision making? Some of the methodologies
employed to inform tradition are more plausible-and less
objectionable-than others.
376. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-65 (1970).
377. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990).
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A. Tradition Reconsidered as a Means of Limiting Government
Power To Abrogate Individual Autonomy
Tradition as a limit on substantive due process could serve as a
powerful brake on the Supreme Court's inherent ability to declare
and enforce unenumerated rights. For it to serve such a function,
however, the Justices must do more to operationalize the test in a
coherent fashion.
Easy cases, involving rights with roots running back to the time
of the framing, are not likely to occur very often. Precisely because
such interests are deeply seated in our nation's legal and cultural
consciousness, only rarely will legislatures enact laws that encroach
on such interests. Even in an era when elected politicians clamor to
"get tough on crime," no state has attempted to reduce the govern-
ment's burden of proof in a criminal trial to something less than
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, the New York statute at
issue in Winship itself was less an abrogation of the standard than
a legislative judgment that juvenile criminal proceedings were not
really the same thing as adult criminal proceedings."'
A substantive due process doctrine limited to protecting the
traditions maintained since time immemorial will not cause much
ruckus. One would expect relatively few instances in which a state
government, or the federal government, would attempt to overthrow
baseline assumptions associated with the American ideal of the rule
of law. Accordingly, the classic use of the tradition test would
minimize judicial interventions and maximize legislative discretion
in unsettled, or only recently settled, areas of the law." 9 This
approach works well in those few cases in which a legislature acts
bizarrely, such that its work product flies in the face of ancient
understandings and practices. But it forecloses any possibility of
establishing new or modified traditions; it fences out all claims that
a new tradition has emerged, that a new national consensus exists
regarding a particular claim of right.
378. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-65.
379. For example, Justice Harlan refused to credit the recent shift away from the
imposition of poll taxes in Harper because such taxes enjoyed a long history in the United
States. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 683-85 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). For Justice Harlan, the imprimatur of history made the practice presumptively
legitimate, even though forty-six of fifty states had abandoned it.
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As an empirical matter, it seems most unlikely that the members
of the Supreme Court would accept such a limitation. Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, for example, specifically have rejected an
approach that limits substantive due process analysis to purely
historical materials.8 They have argued consistently that "history
and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending
point of the substantive due process inquiry."381 Their position is
largely consequentialist: some outcomes are simply too jarring to be
acceptable, even if, as an historical matter, the laws at issue were
quite common. Thus, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, in
their Casey joint opinion, observed that a purely historical approach
to the tradition test would have precluded Loving's conclusion that
interracial marriage is a fundamental right.382 Based on this
example, they argued that "[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the
specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive
sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects. 383
Thus, although the DuncanlWinship approach remains a viable
means of giving the tradition test content, it cannot be the only
approach: some other approach, or combination of approaches, must
also exist, unless the Supreme Court intends to retreat significantly
from its post-Warren Court role as arbiter of contemporary social
380. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part) ("I concur in all but footnote 6 of JUSTICE SCALIA's opinion. This footnote sketches a
mode of historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that may be somewhat inconsistent with our
past decisions in this area. On occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions
protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be 'the most specific level'
available. I would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of
historical analysis." (citations omitted)); see also Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) ("Neither the Bill
of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth
Amendment protects.').
381. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
382. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-48 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)
(noting that "[mlarriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage
was illegal in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt correct in finding
it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the substantive component
of the Due Process Clause").
383. Id. at 848.
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values.3" State counting presents an intriguing additional method-
ology; if states embrace law reform in large numbers, over a
relatively short period of time, a strong argument can be made that
this better reflects "tradition" than the content of the law during
the colonial period.
In Lawrence, for example, Justice Kennedy said that "[i]n all
events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half cen-
tury are of most relevance here. 385 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has invoked state counting in a major substantive due process
opinion: Washington v. Glucksberg.3" Chief Justice Rehnquist, after
declaring the tradition test essential to evaluating the merits of
any substantive due process claim, noted that "[t]he States'
assisted-suicide bans are not innovations" but "[r]ather, they are
longstanding expressions of the States' commitment to the protec-
tion and preservation of all human life."387 He then cited and
quoted Stanford v. Kentucky, an Eighth Amendment case, for the
proposition that "the primary and most reliable indication of [a
national] consensus is ... the pattern of enacted laws."388
Chief Justice Rehnquist also engaged in de facto state counting
to bolster his conclusion that the necessary tradition regarding
physician assisted suicide does not exist. "In almost every State-
indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a crime to assist
a suicide. ' 389 He noted the sole exception to this pattern, Oregon,
which enacted a physician-assisted suicide measure in 1994 by
referendum."9 He closed by noting that "[t]hroughout the Nation,
Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about
the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide"
384. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-16, 719-28 (1997) (applying a
common law history approach to evaluate the claim that substantive due process protects the
right of a terminally ill patient to physician assisted suicide). Glucksberg reflects a valiant
effort by Chief Justice Rehnquist to put the substantive due process genie back into the
bottle. "We begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal
traditions, and practices." Id. at 710. This approach describes Bowers, Winship, and Duncan,
but not Casey or Roe, much less Campbell.
385. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003).
386. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
387. Id. at 710.
388. Id. at 711 (alteration in original) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373
(1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005)).
389. Id. at 710.
390. See id. at 717.
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and emphasizing that "[o]ur holding permits this debate to
continue, as it should in a democratic society."39'
The implication of Chief Justice Rehnquist's logic is that at some
point, if a strong consensus in favor of physician-assisted suicide
develops, the time for debate would be over. Presumably, at that
point, outlier states might be required to "update" their laws by
accepting the new consensus. This happened with respect to poll
taxes, and it also happened with respect to interracial marriage.
The hard question is not whether the federal courts should
recognize and enforce the consensus judgment, but rather identify-
ing when such a consensus has been reached. The Supreme Court
has done very little to indicate the tipping point for establishing a
consensus position. Harper involved a forty-six to four split;39
Loving involved a thirty-six to fourteen division;393 and, most
recently, Lawrence featured a forty-one to nine, or thirty-seven to
thirteen, divide.394 Attempting comprehensive operational rules for
state counting lies beyond the scope of this Article-the immediate
goal is to persuade the reader of the need for greater attention to
operational rules as a general proposition. A few general observa-
tions, however, might be useful.
The Supreme Court should consider using the thirty-eight to
twelve mark as a logical baseline for finding that a consensus
exists. To amend the Constitution, Article V requires ratification by
three-fourths of the state legislatures, or by three-fourths of
conventions called for that purpose. Similarly, if three-fourths of
the state legislatures call for a constitutional convention, Congress
must convene such a meeting.395 The formal amendment process
391. Id. at 735.
392. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,680 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
393. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967).
394. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
395. Constitutional law scholars disagree sharply about whether such a convention could
be limited to a single amendment, or topic, and the extent to which Congress could establish
rules to govern such a convention. See generally Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of
Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1983)
(arguing that the judiciary, not Congress, should review the amendment process); Walter E.
Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the 'imited" Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L.J.
1623 (1979) (arguing that a constitutional convention must have the authority to explore all
issues and cannot be limited to a single amendment); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General
Theory of Article V The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE
L.J. 677 (1993) (discussing the different amendment process theories and proposing a new
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uses three-fourths as the supermajority required to establish
consensus; logically, that number should serve as the presumptive
baseline for establishing a new, or modified, tradition.
Professor Pat Cain has observed that "a question of fundamental
fairness arises when an individual's protection in something as
important as personal intimacy can change significantly merely
by the crossing of a state line." '396 She suggests that "if most states
(and arguably all but two) protect that intimacy, surely we come
to expect that our interests in intimacy will be protected by the
law." '397 Cain then advances a novel theory of constitutional amend-
ment by virtue of state consensus: "At some point, the notion of
fundamental fairness requires that individual rights be ratcheted
up to the prevailing level, especially in cases where the increased
protection causes virtually no harm to anyone else's right other
than the right to state a moral code publicly."39 Cain's suggestion
for a process of state to federal de facto amendment seems persua-
sive; at least arguably, this is precisely what the Supreme Court did
in Loving, Harper, and, most recently, Lawrence. Although she
appreciates the importance of federalism and the role of the states
as laboratories of experimentation, Cain suggests that "[a]t some
point, it would seem to be the responsibility of [the Supreme] Court
to say that enough experimentation has occurred."399
Along similar lines, Professor Michael Klarman, a prominent
legal historian, has suggested that the Supreme Court engages in
a kind of "updating" function that forces noncompliant states to
adopt the majority approach after some period of repose.400
approach). Questions also exist regarding a state's ability to withdraw a call for a convention
after having issued it. All that said, however, everyone agrees that Article V provides that
the magic number is thirty-eight states (or three-fourths of fifty states, or 37.25 rounded up
to the next whole state, the number that triggers an obligation for Congress to respond to a
call for a convention).
396. Patricia A. Cain, The Right to Privacy Under the Montana Constitution: Sex and
Intimacy, 64 MONT. L. REV. 99, 131 (2003).
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 132; see also Althouse, supra note 58, at 1746 ("Even where disuniform
regulation is tolerable, it may be better to substitute national uniformity at some later point
when the best approach to policy has become so clear that the states that maintain their own
approach to a matter no longer appear to be making a positive contribution to any process
of experimentation or to be serving distinctive local conditions and preferences.").
400. Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 381, 391-98 (1997); Michael J.
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Klarman's theory is more descriptive than prescriptive; that is to
say, he asserts that the Supreme Court in fact engages in this
project of "updating" laws to force outlying states to observe the
new national consensus position.4 °"
The Court has yet to indicate how a consensus may be identified:
a state counting approach, with a presumptive baseline of thirty-
eight states abandoning a prior rule, in a relatively short period of
time, would make for a good start. As Justice Stevens emphasized
in Atkins, in some cases "[i]t is not so much the number" of states
changing position "but the consistency of the direction of change"
that provides compelling evidence of a new consensus position,
or if one prefers, a new "tradition."4 °2 This is not to say that the
support of thirty-eight states should be either a sufficient or
necessary condition to establish a new consensus position. The
point is more limited: the Supreme Court should provide some
guidance about how law reform efforts establish a shift or change
in preexisting legal rules and practices. Other relevant consider-
ations would include the pattern of enforcement of a law in states
that have not changed their approach; whether states have moved
in the opposite direction, adopting new proscriptions rather than
repealing old ones; and whether social science data indicates that
most Americans engage in or accept the behavior or practice at
issue. A case presenting an autonomy claim that thirty-eight states
recognize, that has a pattern of consistent law reform toward
deregulation and in favor of personal autonomy, and that features
lax or no enforcement in nonamending states would present a
paradigmatic case for updating.
Many other questions remain. For example, should a twenty-four
to twenty-six split automatically lead to rejection of the due process
claim? That is to say, if a majority of states proscribe or regulate,
should that be given determinative weight in the tradition analysis?
Moreover, are all states of equal weight in ascertaining an evolving
"tradition"? To put the matter bluntly, should Wyoming's answer to
a legal problem carry as much weight as California's in the due
Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721,
1747-64 (2001); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 31-34 (1996).
401. See supra note 400.
402. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
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process analysis? My preliminary answer would be "yes," on the
theory that under Article V, each state has equal voting rights with
respect to the ratification of constitutional amendments. Justice
Scalia has suggested that this is not the only possible approach
-one could adopt the view that some states should count more than
others when trying to assess whether a consensus exists.4 °3
Turning from the existence of the consensus, one also should
worry about the effect of a consensus. In Roe v. Wade, for example,
the Supreme Court required a state regulation of abortion proce-
dures to satisfy strict scrutiny to survive constitutional review.40 4
In other substantive due process cases, however, the Supreme
Court has been less emphatic about the appropriate standard of
review.40 5 Indeed, in the infamous Lochner decision, the majority
403. See id. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Of course if the percentage of legislators voting
for the bill is significant, surely the number of people represented by the legislators voting
for the bill is also significant: the fact that 49% of the legislators in a State with a population
of 60 million voted against the bill should be more impressive than the fact that 90% of the
legislators in a State with a population of 2 million voted for it."). Justice Scalia seemed to
reject this approach in favor of the more traditional every-state-is-equal norm: "What we
have looked for in the past to 'evolve' the Eighth Amendment is a consensus of the same sort
... that adopted the Eighth Amendment: a consensus of the sovereign States that form the
Union, not a nose count of Americans for and against." Id.
404. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court
has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state
interest,' and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake." (citations omitted)).
405. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,65,72 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding that the
fundamental right to oversee the raising of a child triggers "heightened protection" of a
parent's interest in control over a child and concluding that "the visitation order in this case
was an unconstitutional infringement on [a mother's] fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of her two daughters"); id. at 80 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ('The opinions of the plurality, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE SOUTER recognize
such a right, but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review. I
would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights."); Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 95-98 (1987) (declaring marriage to be "a fundamental right" but applying a
"reasonable relationship" test to a Missouri prison rule that prohibited inmates from
marrying while incarcerated, concluding that "the Missouri prison regulation, as written, is
not reasonably related" to legitimate penological interests); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
383 (1978) ("Since our past decisions make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental
importance, and since the classification at issue here significantly interferes with the
exercise of that right, we believe that 'critical examination' of the state interests advanced
in support of the classification is required."); id. at 388 ("When a statutory classification
significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless
it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate
only those interests."); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality
1004
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purported to apply nothing more demanding than a rule of reason-
ableness or rationality.4 °6
In framing the burden a state must meet to abrogate an
unenumerated, yet fundamental, right, the Supreme Court should
consider imposing a less demanding test in cases involving new or
emerging traditions, or consensus, than would apply in cases
involving traditions enjoying longer roots in the common law.
Rather than imposing strict scrutiny, it might be more appropriate
to test regulations of relatively new fundamental rights under a
standard of intermediate scrutiny. In assessing the emergence of a
new tradition, there is always the possible risk of a false positive;
as the period of time that the right has existed shrinks, the risk of
a false positive increases.4"" In addition, when a right lacks deep
historical roots, states should enjoy some greater freedom to
experiment with the scope and conditions associated with the
exercise of the right. It might be unwise to move directly to a strict
scrutiny model of review, even if a consensus has emerged that
regulations affecting a particular interest should be subject to
something more demanding than rational basis review.40 8
opinion) ("But when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living
arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental
interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation.");
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1974) (holding that substantive due
process "requires that such rules [burdening the exercise of a fundamental right] must not
needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon" the right); id. at 643 ("We thus conclude
that the arbitrary cutoff dates embodied in the mandatory leave rules before us have no
rational relationship to the valid state interest of preserving continuity of instruction.").
406. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) ("There is no reasonable ground for
interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours
of labor, in the occupation of a baker."); id. at 58 ("There is, in our judgment, no reasonable
foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the
public health or the health of the individuals who are following the trade of a baker."); id. at
62 (holding that the New York law 'is, in our judgment, so wholly beside the matter of a
proper, reasonable and fair provision, as to run counter to that liberty of person and of free
contract provided for in the Federal Constitution").
407. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (urging caution in recognizing any new societal consensus, based on the example
of the general tendency of the states to have abolished the death penalty before later
reversing that tendency and reinstating the death penalty).
408. See David A. Strauss, Essay, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 375
(2003) ("My conclusion ... is that the Lochner-era Court acted defensibly in recognizing
freedom of contract but indefensibly in exalting it."); id. at 386 (suggesting that Lochner was
problematic not because the claim advanced by the bakery owner was utterly implausible,
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Although the Casey joint opinion does not directly explain its
shift from strict scrutiny to de facto intermediate scrutiny,4 °9 by
virtue of the "undue burden" test, one could argue in favor of the
less demanding standard of review on the theory that abortion
rights represent a new tradition, or consensus; therefore, states
should enjoy broader authority to regulate than would be the case
for changing the standard for establishing guilt in a criminal trial.
Justice Ginsburg, for example, has argued that Roe would have
generated less controversy, and left the right to reproductive
freedom on a firmer constitutional basis, had Justice Blackmun
authored a less categorical opinion.41 °
In light of the risk of a false positive, and the possibility of useful
further experimentation by the states, a standard of review less
demanding than strict scrutiny should probably apply when the
Supreme Court considers the constitutional status of regulations
burdening fundamental rights of more recent vintage. Although this
approach will not avoid all problems, it would reduce the risk of the
Supreme Court recognizing and overenforcing a phantom funda-
mental right. Moreover, to the extent that a consensus is fresh,
persistent dissenting states should be afforded some opportunity to
engage in voluntary law reform efforts. Applying strict scrutiny to
but rather that the 'justices' failure was in a sense a lack of humility: an inability, or refusal,
to understand that although they were vindicating an important value, matters were more
complicated than they thought").
409. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) ("Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden
on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause."); cf. id. at 929 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part) ("The Court has held that
limitations on the right of privacy are permissible only if they survive 'strict' constitutional
scrutiny-that is, only if the governmental entity imposing the restriction can demonstrate
that the limitation is both necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest."); id. at 964 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that Roe "adopted a 'fundamental right' standard under which
state regulations could survive only if they met the requirement of 'strict scrutiny"' and
observing that "[w]hile we disagree with that standard, it at least had a recognized basis in
constitutional law at the time Roe was decided"); id. at 988 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("The rootless nature of the 'undue burden'
standard, a phrase plucked out of context from our earlier abortion decisions, is further
reflected in the fact that the joint opinion finds it necessary expressly to repudiate the more
narrow formulations used in JUSTICE O'CONNOR's earlier opinions.").
410. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Essay, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375, 381-82 (1985).
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state legislation tends to end, rather than encourage, continued
dialogue between the federal courts and the political branches of
the state governments.
In sum, the Supreme Court should engage in state counting as a
means of ascertaining the emergence of a new consensus regarding
a claimed fundamental right. State counting should not be used in
isolation, without regard to the actual pattern or practice of law
enforcement, or the overall legal background against which reform
efforts have occurred.41' In addition, the Court should perhaps make
some effort to differentiate new fundamental rights from old by
adjusting the standard of review to allow states a greater margin
of appreciation in attempting to regulate emerging fundamental
rights.
B. The Theory Applied: Lawrence as an Example of Bottom Up
Federalism
Taking into account all the considerations discussed to this point,
how does Lawrence stack up as a substantive due process decision
applying the tradition test? All in all, Lawrence holds up very well
indeed.
1. The Majority Opinion: The State Counting Methodology in
Action
Lawrence involved a Texas prosecution of John Geddes Lawrence
and Tyron Garner for engaging in anal sex in their Houston, Texas
apartment.412 Police entered the apartment based on a report of a
weapons disturbance; upon entering the apartment, they found
Lawrence and Garner engaged in anal sex.413 Both men were
subsequently charged and convicted of violating Texas's statute
411. See Post, supra note 193, at 8, 10, 82-87 (arguing that federal courts can and must
adjust constitutional understandings to reflect changes in cultural understandings, in part
because "[c]hanging cultural norms and practices quintessentially constitute 'new conditions'
that justify such constitutional pliability," and suggesting that "[i]nstead of pursuing the
chimerical objective of neutrality, the Court would do better to analyze the conditions under
which courts should properly make cultural judgments").
412. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-63 (2003).
413. Id.
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proscribing "deviate sexual intercourse. 414 The state trial judge
sentenced each man to a fine of $200 and court costs.41 Lawrence
and Garner then pursued unsuccessful appeals of their convictions
through the Texas state courts; after exhausting these appeals, the
couple sought and obtained review in the U.S. Supreme Court.1 6
Justice Kennedy opened the majority opinion in Lawrence by
observing that "[1]iberty protects the person from unwarranted
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places." '417
This concept of liberty "presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate con-
duct. '418 Justice Kennedy was painting with a very broad brush;
indeed, the initial pages of the majority opinion are very high on
rhetoric, but rather low on specifics. 419 As one would expect, Justice
Kennedy then engaged the question of the "tradition" Bowers
identified against according due process protection to same-sex
intimacy: "At the outset it should be noted that there is no long-
standing history in this country of laws directed at homosexual
conduct as a distinct matter.""42 Moreover, "[1]aws prohibiting
sodomy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting
adults acting in private. '421 When prosecutions took place, it was
usually to "ensure there would be no lack of coverage if a predator
committed a sexual assault that did not constitute rape as defined
by the criminal law;" thus, there was no "rigorous and systematic"
attempt to enforce such laws.4 2 More recent laws, generally dating
from the 1970s, did target homosexuals as a class, but these laws
414. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003).
415. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 562.
418. Id.
419. See id. at 567 ("When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to
make this choice.").
420. Id. at 568. This is true, if by that one means laws targeting homosexuals as a distinct
cultural subgroup and attempting to proscribe sexual practices associated with this
subgroup. See Eskridge, supra note 16, at 644-65.
421. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569.
422. Id. at 569-70.
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were significantly different from the "crimes against nature"
statutes that preexisted them.42
Justice Kennedy conceded that, as an historical matter, "for
centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual
conduct as immoral." '424 But, he added that "[i]n all events we think
that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most
relevance here."425 Looking at this tradition, Justice Kennedy noted
that the "25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct ...
are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against
homosexual conduct. '426 And, even in these thirteen states "there is
a pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults
acting in private. 427
These observations, standing alone, more than justified the
majority's decision to break with Bowers and to recognize a
fundamental right of privacy that extends, in spacial terms, to
consensual intimacy between adults, in private. The states have
moved, en masse, to dump their laws regulating noncommercial,
consensual sex acts between adults in private. Even those states
that retain legal proscriptions against sodomy do not bother to
enforce them very much or very often. Absent a substantial or
important state interest to justify imposing a burden on the right
of privacy, Lawrence and Garner should be free to conduct their
private lives as they think best.428
Justice Kennedy, however, offered an additional rationale for in-
validating the Texas sodomy statutes, which had nothing to do with
domestic legal traditions: 'To the extent Bowers relied on values we
share with a wider civilization, it should be noted that the reason-
ing and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. 429 Justice
423. Id. at 570.
424. Id. at 571.
425. Id. at 571-72.
426. Id. at 573.
427. Id.; see also id. at 576 ("The courts of five different States have declined to follow
[Bowers] in interpreting provisions in their own state constitutions parallel to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
428. See Pamela S. Karlan, Lecture, 'Tricking the Lines': The Due Process Clauses,
Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88MINN.L.REV. 880,913 (2004) (arguing that
"[a]lthough the states are free to adopt different positions on how to impose punishment and
on how much punishment to impose, there is some constitutional limit on the degree of
permissible deviation from national norms").
429. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
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Kennedy referenced the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights and the domestic law of "[o]ther nations" to support the
claim that "[t]he right the petitioners seek in this case has been
accepted as an integral part of human freedom. 43 ° Unlike the
relatively recent vintage of antisodomy statutes targeting homosex-
uals, the law reform movement in the states to abolish antisodomy
laws, and the consistent lack of meaningful enforcement of such
laws in the states that retained them, the content of foreign law
does not seem at all relevant to ascertaining whether a consensus,
or tradition, existed in the United States that recognized the right
of gay and lesbian couples to private intimate acts free and clear of
state regulation. Justice Kennedy actually undermined the strength
of his argument by invoking foreign legal sources in this context.
After performing a careful analysis of the history, pattern of
enforcement, and direction of legal change associated with anti-
sodomy laws, along with the gratuitous consideration of foreign law
on the subject, Justice Kennedy announced that "Bowers v.
Hardwick should be and now is overruled."4 In stirring language,
Justice Kennedy validated the significance of the relationships that
same-sex couples create and maintain:
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to
liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right
to engage in their conduct without intervention of the govern-
ment.432
Because the 'Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of
the individual,"433 Lawrence and Garner's substantive due process
rights took precedence on the facts presented.4 4
430. Id. at 576-77; see also id. at 572-73 (discussing the 1967 repeal of British antisodomy
laws and other foreign developments).
431. Id. at 578.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Justice Kennedy was careful to limit the scope of the right being recognized:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent
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2. The Dissent's Attempt To Turn Back the Clock to
Palko/Twining
Justice Scalia's intemperate dissent in Lawrence longed for a
time gone by, best characterized by the pre-Duncan approach to
substantive due process. Accordingly, most of his arrows fell quite
wide of the mark. Justice Scalia argued, for example, that establish-
ing a tradition in U.S. law is not a sufficient condition for conveying
substantive due process recognition to a right. He argued that "[a]n
asserted 'fundamental liberty interest' must not only be 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' but it must also be
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' so that 'neither liberty
nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed."'435 But this attempted
reversion to the Palko/Twining formulation flies in the face of
Duncan and Winship.43 A domestic legal tradition has been
sufficient, at least since 1968, to establish the existence of a fun-
damental right.
Moreover, given Chief Justice Rehnquist's importation of the
Eighth Amendment state counting practice in Glucksberg, it seems
odd for Justice Scalia to demand something more than a contempo-
rary consensus regarding the existence of a fundamental right.4"'
Scalia thundered that "[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring
into existence because some States choose to lessen or eliminate
criminal sanctions on certain behavior."4 This simply is not true;
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence relies extensively on contempo-
might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.
It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.
Id. Obviously, these are some significant qualifiers. Moreover, many of them involve the very
sort of moral considerations that the Lawrence majority suggests are not an appropriate
basis for social legislation. See id. at 577 (stating that "the fact that the governing majority
in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason
for upholding a law prohibiting the practice" (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)));
see also id. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that "[moral
disapproval" is not an interest sufficient "to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause).
435. Id. at 593 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
436. See supra notes 99-128 and accompanying text.
437. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) ("In almost every state ... it
is a crime to assist a suicide.").
438. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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rary state practices to determine whether a particular practice is
"cruel and unusual. 4 3' And, even if one might claim that the text of
the Eighth Amendment justifies a more contemporary focus than
the text of the Due Process Clauses, the fact remains that the
Supreme Court has used state law reform efforts to inform
fundamental rights since the Warren Court's time. Loving and
Harper engaged in just this sort of analysis, as did Glucksberg.4 ° If
the absence of a consensus counts against recognition of a new
fundamental right, then surely the existence of a consensus counts
toward recognition of a fundamental right.
Justice Scalia's attack on the majority's historical predicate is not
significantly more persuasive than his doctrinal attack. For
example, he contested the notion that sodomy laws are not enforced
on the basis of "134 reported cases involving prosecutions for
consensual, adult, homosexual sodomy" over the course of the last
fifty years.441 That represents less than three prosecutions per
state, over the course of half a century! If one compared those
statistics with prosecutions for heroin possession, the relative
commitment to enforcement would be clear. It must be that Justice
Scalia views the existence of a law in the books, even without any
effort, ever, to enforce it, as precluding the recognition of an
unenumerated, fundamental right.
Justice Scalia also made much of Justice Kennedy's conclusion
that Texas lacked a legitimate state interest to justify its anti-
sodomy law. He stated that, "[n]ot once does [the majority] describe
homosexual sodomy as a 'fundamental right' or a 'fundamental
liberty interest,' nor does it subject the Texas statute to strict
scrutiny.''442 He suggested that "the Court concludes that the
application of Texas's statute to petitioners' conduct fails the
rational-basis test. 443 As Professor Laurence Tribe has argued,
439. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is, after all, a subset of substantive due process,
given that it is the Due Process Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment itself that the
Supreme Court enforces against the states. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)
(holding that"the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions"
is one factor to consider when determining if a punishment is cruel and unusual).
440. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
441. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
442. Id. at 594.
443. Id.
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Justice Scalia grossly overstated the significance of the majority's
"legitimate state interest" language.444 Only in the pre-Casey
abortion cases did the Supreme Court routinely use the phrase
"strict scrutiny" to describe the government's burden in saving a
regulation that infringes a fundamental right. In many, if not most,
substantive due process cases, including Troxel, the Court either
specified no level of review or defaulted to tests involving rational-
ity, reasonableness, or arbitrariness.445
The most serious objection one could make to Justice Kennedy's
opinion-his reliance on foreign law to inform domestic legal
tradition-received only a short, glancing blow. Justice Scalia
pouted that constitutional rights do not "spring into existence, as
the Court seems to believe, because foreign nations decriminalize
conduct."44 The relatively short shrift that Justice Scalia gave the
majority's use of foreign law probably reflects the gratuitous nature
of those citations; because the majority's opinion would stand
without the invocation of foreign law, a sustained attack on this
aspect of Justice Kennedy's opinion would do little to undermine its
overall persuasive force.
Perhaps Justice Scalia's best point was his rejection of the notion
that moral disapprobation cannot serve as the basis for law. Such
an approach "effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation."44
The easy answer to this objection is that the majority really did
not mean what it seemed to be saying; community morals remain
a valid basis for legal proscription. The real question in Lawrence
was whether the community actually has a serious moral objection
to same-sex intimacy, an objection so deeply seated as to justify
criminalization of such conduct. Justice Kennedy mustered objec-
tive evidence establishing that, by 2003, most communities no
longer viewed such regulation as necessary-and, even in those
communities that still maintained formal regulation of such
conduct, enforcement was virtually nonexistent.
444. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 1916-17.
445. See supra notes 404-08 and accompanying text.
446. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
447. Id. at 599.
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3. The Real Reason for the Lawrence Decision
The most compelling factor Justice Kennedy invoked in his
majority opinion in Lawrence was the shift in state laws from 1961
to 2003. In 1961, every state and the District of Columbia main-
tained a prohibition against sodomy; in the intervening forty-two
years, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia changed
their minds.44 ' This kind of sea change, especially when viewed
against the virtual nonenforcement of the laws in the remaining
thirteen states, made Lawrence a very easy case.
The majority also recognized that more was at stake than just the
demoralizing effect of a precatory law: 'When homosexual conduct
is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of
itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimina-
tion both in the public and in the private spheres." '449 Such state
laws, and Bowers's endorsement of them as consistent with the
American constitutional tradition, "demeans the lives of homosex-
ual persons. 45°
Lawrence fits very comfortably into the line of cases, including
Loving and Harper, that force resistant states to accept a new
national consensus on an important autonomy interest. The right
to pursue intimacy with a person of one's choice in 2003 stands on
the same cultural footing as interracial marriage in 1967 and voting
without payment of a poll tax in 1966. These decisions all deploy
substantive due process to measure the pace of constitutional
change and, if a consensus has developed, to nationalize that
consensus.451' These decisions take seriously Justice Harlan's
admonition that due process rights incorporate not only the
traditions from which we have come, but also those traditions with
448. Id. at 572-73 (majority opinion).
449. Id. at 575. Justice Kennedy went on to explain that "It]he stigma this criminal statute
imposes, moreover, is not trivial." Id. Those convicted of the offense would have a permanent
criminal record, might have to register in some states as sex offenders, and would suffer the
"other collateral consequences always following a conviction, such as notations on job
application forms." Id. at 575-76.
450. Id. at 575.
451. But see Bernstein, supra note 20, at 60 ("The recent Lawrence opinion asserting a
Fourteenth Amendment right for adults to engage in homosexual sodomy is even more
Lochnerian because the Court has fully shifted from protecting 'privacy,' which at least had
the pretense on relying on penumbral rights, to protecting 'liberty."').
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which we have broken. An approach that gives dispositive effect
to the prior existence of laws proscribing a particular course of
conduct, and no effect whatsoever to the rampant repeal or
invalidation of such laws, fails to honor the notion that "tradition
is a living thing"4 2 or to engage "tradition" in a meaningful fashion.
C. From Bowers to Lawrence: Social Change and De Facto
Amendments Through State Government Practice
The Supreme Court reached the right result in Lawrence and
offered the right reasons in support of its decision. The sea change
in state law regarding the regulation of noncommercial, private
sexual intimacy establishes that the nation has a new social-and
legal--consensus regarding the scope of sexual autonomy. When
coupled with the lack of serious enforcement efforts in those states
that still maintained antisodomy laws, the case for "updating" the
Constitution through substantive due process becomes even more
compelling.
Justice Kennedy's focus on the direction of legal change over the
last fifty years, rather than the preceding 250 years, also seemed
justified if the tradition test is to honor not only old traditions,
but also new ones. A tradition test that does not look beyond Lord
Coke will largely eliminate substantive due process review for
contemporary legal claims. Moreover, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter have repeatedly said they will not limit substantive due
process to a purely retrospective, long term history, methodology.453
Lawrence reaffirmed the methodology employed in Harper and
Loving; a methodology that seems to have become the primary
approach to giving meaning to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishments.4 4 State governments, acting
through the state legislature or state courts, can amend the federal
Constitution by collectively establishing a new national consensus
position regarding the regulation, or nonregulation, of particular
behavior. Contrary to Justice Scalia's outraged assertion that
"[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because
452. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
453. See supra notes 380-83 and accompanying text.
454. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
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some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on
certain behavior,"455 contemporary state law reform efforts can and
should inform the meaning of "due process of law."
In some cases, state counting will lead to the expansion of due
process rights; in others, however, this approach might require the
Justices to permit the period of state experimentation to continue.
This is not necessarily a bad thing; as Justice White warned in
Bowers: "The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution. '456 To be sure, Justice White was a persistent, but not
entirely implacable, critic of the post-Griswold renaissance of
substantive due process.45 v Even Justices generally sympathetic to
substantive due process, however, have cautioned against its
overuse.
458
To the extent that the Supreme Court can ground substantive
due process in an empirical inquiry into the current state of the
law, the direction of law reform, and the commitment of states to
enforcing their preexisting laws, the danger of the doctrine
morphing into Lochner-ism seems quite remote. On the other hand,
when the Supreme Court invalidates state laws without any basis
other than a "raised eyebrow" or a sense of outrage, the risk of an
appearance of illegitimacy becomes much stronger.
455. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
456. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
457. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "[t]he Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant
mothers and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right with
sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes" and criticizing the
majority's decision as "an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial
review that the Constitution extends to this Court"); but see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 502, 504 (1965) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (joining the majority to
invalidate the Connecticut ban on the sale and use of contraceptive devices but suggesting
that the test for invalidating the law is whether the statute is "reasonably necessary for the
effectuation of a legitimate and substantial state interest, and not arbitrary or capricious in
application').
458. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(Powell, J.) ("As the history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest
the only limits to such judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen
at the time to be Members of this Court.").
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1. The BMW v. Gore Line of Cases Lacks a Tradition-based
Predicate and Oversteps the Proper Limits of Substantive Due
Process
From the vantage point of tradition, the Supreme Court's
punitive damages cases raise the specter of Lochnerizing." 9 This is
because they do not have any serious claim to the imprimatur of
tradition, nor has the tort reform movement established a clear
consensus position on limiting punitive damages to, say, a nine to
one ratio with respect to compensatory damages.46 ° To be sure, state
tort reform efforts are an ongoing project in many, if not most,
jurisdictions. But just as the Supreme Court refused to end the
debate regarding physician-assisted suicide in the absence of a clear
national consensus regarding the practice, the Supreme Court
should not be nationalizing tort law through substantive due
process. "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an
earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and
practicality"4 '' of tort reform; the Supreme Court's holdings should
"permit this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic
society." '462
There is no principled distinction to be drawn between tort
reform, on the one hand, and physician-assisted suicide (PAS), on
the other. In neither case does tradition, viewed over a long period,
validate a right to PAS or to limits on punitive damages. Viewed
459. Of course, some legal scholars have leveled this criticism at the Roe/Casey line of
precedents. See Bernstein, supra note 20, at 56 ("For better or for worse, Griswold and Roe's
protection of the unenumerated right to privacy raises many of the same issues as Lochner's
protection of the unenumerated right to liberty of contract, a conclusion that cannot be
glossed over with the fallacious claim that Lochner was really about prohibiting class
legislation."); Strauss, supra note 408, at 378 ("Today, the attack on Lochner has to
acknowledge that a judicial practice that has important similarities to Lochner-the
systematic judicial elaboration of constitutional rights, in the face of a significant degree of
popular opposition-has been accepted by, in fact celebrated by, mainstream legal thought.").
460. Indeed, one of the most persuasive defenses of these decisions, authored by Professor
Marty Redish, does not even attempt to justify them on substantive due process
grounds-instead, Professor Redish argues that the decisions should be understood solely in
procedural due process terms. See Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive
Damages Are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 48-53 (2004). This is an intriguing way of
reframing the debate and provides, at least potentially, a more persuasive basis for imposing
federal constitutional limits on state punitive damage awards.
461. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
462. Id.
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over a shorter time frame, say the last fifty years, it is obvious that
the tradition against PAS and in favor of unlimited, jury-controlled
punitive damages is giving way. Precisely how and where the
various law reform projects will leave us as a people remains to be
determined.
On these facts, it is enough for the Supreme Court to indicate
that the claims implicate due process concerns, but that no pre-
existing or emerging tradition precludes existing state practices.
Employing Justice O'Connor's language, originally applied in an
Eighth Amendment context, "[t]he day may come when there is
such general legislative rejection" of proscriptions against PAS, or
unlimited jury punitive damages awards, "that a clear national
consensus can be said to have developed." '463 In both cases, however,
again borrowing Justice O'Connor's language in Stanford, "I do not
believe that day has yet arrived." '464 And, "[b]y leaving open for now
the broader ... question[s] ..., the approach I take allows the
ultimate moral issue[s] at stake in the constitutional question[s] to
be addressed in the first instance by those best suited to do so, the
people's elected representatives." '465
At bottom, the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence,
which considers whether a particular award is "grossly excessive,"
rests on little more than application of "a suspicious judicial
eyebrow." '466 Surely Justice White was correct when he argued that
constitutional "judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely
the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be
informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent." '467
Yet, because of the lack of a consensus among the states regard-
ing appropriate limits to punitive damages, the Supreme Court's
463. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 381-82 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75
(2005).
464. Id. at 382.
465. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 858-59 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
466. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
467. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). Ironically, Justice O'Connor has
specifically endorsed this proposition in the context of her advocacy of federal constitutional
review of state jury punitive damages awards. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 480 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("As an initial matter, constitutional judgements should not be, or appear to be,
merely the subjective views of individual Justices." (quotation and citation omitted)).
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jurisprudence appears to be little more than an ad hoc review by a
jury of nine.4"8
2. Foreign Law Should Play a Very Limited Role in Substantive
Due Process Adjudication
Although Lawrence provides a persuasive rationale for disallow-
ing the continued maintenance of antisodomy laws, it also offers a
superfluous rationale that works against the persuasive force of the
majority's claim that a new consensus has emerged. In two places,
Justice Kennedy invoked the rejection of antisodomy laws in foreign
jurisdiction as persuasive evidence against Texas's ability to
maintain and enforce such a law today.469 Given that Lawrence is
not a close case if one confines the evidence of tradition to domestic
sources, this recourse to foreign law seems very strange indeed. At
one time, the Supreme Court routinely referenced foreign law when
deciding whether a particular rule or practice was "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."47 Since Duncan v. Louisiana, however,
the Supreme Court's application of the tradition test has focused
solely on domestic, or "Anglo-American," legal traditions.471 This is
as it should be.
If one allows consideration of foreign legal materials to validate
a claim, it seems only fair to permit introduction of such materials
to defeat a claim. For example, the German Federal Constitutional
Court has found that personhood begins at conception and has
struck down German laws liberalizing access to abortion.472 Would
it be appropriate, in considering whether a fetus is a person for
468. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 602, 606 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(objecting that the majority "provides virtually no guidance to legislatures, and to state and
federal courts, as to what a 'constitutionally proper' level of punitive damages might be" and
characterizing the majority's self-described "guideposts" as little more than "crisscrossing
platitudes" that will "yield no real answers in no real cases").
469. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,572-73,576-77 (2003) (invoking rejection and repeal
of antisodomy laws in Western European nations and rejection of such laws in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as persuasive evidence against
allowing such laws in the United States).
470. See supra Part II.D.
471. 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
472. See Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and
American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 1034-37, 1039-43, 1045-48;
Krotoszynski, supra note 213, at 1321, 1325 & n.19.
2006] 1019
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, to import Germany's
conception of personhood? Certainly a litigant opposed to abortion
on demand would think it as relevant as the materials cited in
Lawrence.
The Supreme Court has been engaged, for the past twenty or so
years, in a running battle over whether foreign law should influence
domestic constitutional interpretation. Justice Breyer has been a
forceful advocate of efforts to internationalize the Supreme Court's
decision process; he routinely cites foreign legal precedents and
practices in support of interpretative positions involving the
Constitution. Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg have endorsed
recourse to foreign legal materials,473 although they have not
incorporated references to such materials in their opinions with the
same alacrity as Justices Breyer474 or Stevens.4' Justice Breyer,
commenting on the practice, has acknowledged that "[o]bviously,
this foreign authority does not bind us."47 He argues, however, that
"this Court has long considered as relevant and informative the way
in which foreign courts have applied standards roughly comparable
to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable circum-
473. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sherman J. Bellwood Lecture, Looking Beyond Our Borders:
The Value of a Comparatiue Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1,
6-10 (2003) (describing the modern Supreme Court's use of foreign legal sources in its
decisions and predicting that Justices will continue this practice going forward in time);
Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address Before the American Society of International Law
(Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002) (endorsing consideration of
foreign legal precedents in domestic law); Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons:
Why American Judges and Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, INT'L JUD. OBSERVER,
June 1997, at 2 (same).
474. See Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992-93 (2002) (mem.) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (noting that "[clourts of other nations have found that delays" in
execution of capital sentence "can render capital punishment degrading, shocking, or cruel"
and citing authorities from the United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Court of Human
Rights); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995-98 (1999) (mem.) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (citing authorities from Canada, India, Jamaica, and the European Court
of Human Rights in support of proposition that long delay between capital sentence and
execution can constitute "cruel and unusual" punishment).
475. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (citing in opinion for the Court
practices of foreign nations regarding the execution of the mentally retarded); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830, 831 n.34 (1988) (plurality opinion) (citing the practices of
Western European nations regarding the execution of individuals less than sixteen years of
age).
476. Knight, 528 U.S. at 996 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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stances." '477 Justice Breyer then cited a half-dozen cases invoking
foreign law. What he failed to mention, however, was that in many
of these cases, the majority cited foreign law incident to rejecting a
constitutional claim; the Supreme Court has relied on foreign legal
authority far less frequently to recognize or expand constitutional
rights.478
On the other side of the fence, former Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, have been persistent foes of this
practice.479
477. Id. at 997.
478. Beyond Lawrence, in modern times the Supreme Court has relied on foreign legal
materials supporting a domestic legal claim and granted the claims in several Eighth
Amendment cases. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-89, 796 n.22 (1982); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595 & 596 n.10 (1977); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958).
More commonly, however, the Supreme Court cites foreign legal practices incident to
rejecting recognition of a new constitutional claim. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 710 n.8 (1997); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-84 & n.25 (1961);
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 183-89 (1880).
479. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (2003)
(objecting to the majority's "discussion of ... foreign views" and arguing that "this Court ...
should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans" (quotation and citation
omitted); Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) ("While
Congress, as a legislature, may wish to consider the actions of other nations on any issue it
likes, this Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads,
or fashions on Americans."); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322, 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(objecting to the majority's "decision to place weight on foreign laws," suggesting
consideration of such matters "is antithetical to considerations of federalism," and
questioning "how the views of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens
provide any support for the Court's ultimate determination"); id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Equally irrelevant are the practices of the 'world community,' whose notions of
justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people."); Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (Thomas,
J., concurring in denial of certiorari) ("I write only to point out that I am unaware of any
support in the American constitutional tradition or in this Court's precedent for the
[appellant's position] .... Indeed, were there any such support in our own jurisprudence, it
would be unnecessary for proponents of the claim to rely on the European Court of Human
Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council.");
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) ("We emphasize that it is American
conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their
various amici ... that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant."), abrogated
by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he practices of other nations, particularly other democracies,
can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely
a historical accident, but rather so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that it occupies
a place not merely in our mores but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well") (quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 794 (1969).
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Where a national consensus exists regarding the viability of an
autonomy value, as in Lawrence, recourse to foreign legal materials
is at best superfluous. At worst, recourse to such sources under-
mines the claim that a domestic consensus exists regarding the
claim at bar. Sometimes, less really is more, if by "tradition" the
Supreme Court means the values and practices of the people of the
United States.
CONCLUSION
Legal scholars like Herbert Wechsler, John Hart, Henry
Wellington, and Albert Saks all advocate the "passive virtues," the
idea that sometimes the best judicial decision might be no decision
at all, at least on the merits."' The Legal Process school also
advances the idea that the legitimacy of judicial review rests on the
perception and reality that judges are engaged in an interpretive,
rather than wholly creative, enterprise."' If the public comes to
believe that judges are merely imposing their own subjective moral
preferences, rather than enforcing determinate constitutional
constraints, judicial review might come under popular attack. In no
area does the Supreme Court risk its appearance of principled
decision making more than when it identifies and protects
unenumerated, yet fundamental, rights.
Substantive due process would benefit immeasurably if the
Dumbo's feather of tradition could be reworked into something
resembling an operational test that not only serves as justification
for results that a majority of the Justices might like to reach, but
also as a brake against results that a majority of the Justices might
like to reach-but that tradition, or consensus, does not yet
sanction.
In particular, state counting could provide an important means
of cabining judicial discretion in substantive due process cases, by
making the application of the tradition test turn on less subjective
considerations. A carefully theorized and operationalized effort at
state counting might provide a useful way of identifying and
480. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 15-20 (1959).
481. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play and the
Quest for Legitimate Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 993, 1008-10 (1999).
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protecting the traditions from which we have broken, which are no
less deserving of constitutional protection than those traditions
from which we have come. A commitment to maintain tradition as
a living concept demands no less.
